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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the extent and nature of 
North .American commercial involvement in the Argentine 
Republic, 1880-1914. Political and cultural factors 
are also considered in explaining the development of 
closer economic relations between the two countries. 
In 1880 the commercial position of the United 
States on the River Plate was weak. North American 
exporters lacked adequate banking, shipping and mail 
facilities and were largely ignorant of Argentine 
tastes and requirements. Over the next thirty years 
these obstacles were overcome mainly due to the internal 
expansion of both countries. The resulting growth in 
United States awareness of and trade with the Republic 
is studied along with Argentine reaction to such 
diverse stimulants as Pan:.:..America.nism, the wool tariff 
and battleship diplomacy, 
A constant and important feature of this greater 
United States involvement with Argentina was an 
increasing Anglo-American rivalry on the Plate. Many 
Britons regarded the Argentine Republic as an essential, 
if informal part of the British Empire. Faced with a 
United States increasingly determined to assert its 
new economic and political power, British merchants 
I 
and officials fought to retain their region of influence. 
Relations between London and Washington, and between 
the English and North American communities at Buenos 
Aires are therefore also treated in depth. 
iv. 
A broadly chronological framework has been 
adopted to examine the development of the United States-
Argentine relationship. In Chapter Four this is 
dispensed with to allow a case study of North 
.American financial penetration into the Argentine 
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INTRODUCTION 
At the end of the nineteenth century the 
United States was looking to develop closer ties with 
Latin America. Her businessmen and politicians began 
to actively promote the concept of regional commerce 
and diplomacy. Sponsored by Secretary of state James 
G. Blaine, the First International Conference of 
1 • 
American States met in Washington on October 2nd, 1889. 
Argued he, 11while the great powers of Europe are 
steadily enlarging their colonial domination in Asia 
and Africa it is the especial province of this 
country to improve and expand its trade with the 
nations of America. 111 
Underlying this belief was the changing indust-
rial capacity of the United States. Hitherto a producer 
of raw materials, the 11 Colossus of the North" had 
emerged as one of the world's principal manufacturing 
powers. With the domestic market oversupplied, the 
need to find an overseas outlet was urgent. South 
America seemed both by geographical proximity and 
economic necessity, the natural area in which to 
expand. 
1Quoted in Humphreys, R.A. "Anglo-American 
Rivalries and the Venezuela Crisis of 1895. 11 
Transactions of the Roral Historical Society, Fifth 
Series, Vol. 17 (1967, pg.146 
2. 
Within that region United States manufacturers 
showed a particular interest in Argentina. The 
Southern Republic at this time was experiencing 
unprecedented internal development. Railways were 
being built, the pampas cultivated, and the immigrants 
arriving at a rate relatively greater than that of the 
United states. 2 Already the richest state in Latin 
America, Argentina looked like emulating the economic 
success of her northern neighbour. 
In 1880 trade between the two countries was smaJ..l, 
$8,097,416. 3 North .American businessmen, however, had 
already begun working for a greater share of the 
Argentine market. United States industrial exhibitions 
now included exhibits from Buenos Aires and other South 
American countries, while North American manufacturers 
had started sending samples to that region. Increasingly 
writers like William Curtis were talking of rich 
opportunities within the Southern Republic. 4 
2Between 1881 and 1910 Argentina retained a net 
of 2120786 immigrants. McGann, T.F. Arfentina~ the 
United States and the Inter-American Sys em 188 -1914. 
(dambridge, 1957), pg.10-11 
.~Statistical Abstract of the United States, 
Eleventh Number, 1888 (Washington, 1889), pg.57 
4see Curtis, w.E. The Ca~itals of Spanish 
America (New York, 1888) and Tra e and Transportation 
Between the United States and Spanish America 
(Washington, 1889). 
This new United States involvement with 
Argentina was paralleled by the beginnings of Anglo-
American trade rivalry on the River Plate. The 
British community at Buenos Aires comprised over 
4000 persons in 1887. The majority of these occupied 
positions in the management of railroads, banks or 
estancias. In contrast there were less than 600 
United States citizens resident in the city, many of 
whom lived in modest ciroumstances. 5 Observed Hiram 
3. 
Bingham, "The Anglo-Saxons that you see briskly walking 
along the sidewalks are not .Americans, but clean-shaven, 
red-cheeked, vigorous Britishers. 116 
Between the two communities there was some degree 
of social intercourse. On July 4th many Englishmen 
attended the celebrations at the United States 
Legation, while after President McKinley 1 s assassination 
English commercial houses displayed the Stars and 
Stripes at halfmast. 7 Churches, charities and clubs 
were in many cases shared with either the United States 
or British Consul acting as chairman. 8 The British and 
5vilas to Blaine, July 25, 1889. National 
Archives, De!artment of state Records, .American Affairs, 
Argentina, D plomatic Des~atches (Hereafter cited as 
Dip. Des.) Vol. 27, no.2 4. Lord to Hay• Sept. 27, 1901. 
Dip. Des. Vol. 40, no.142. 
Bos New Yor, 1 
7Lord to Hay, Sept. 27, 1901. Dip.Des. Vol. 40, 
no .142 
8Buchanan to Olney, Dec. 27, 1896. Dip.Des. Vol.34, 
no.288. 
4 • 
.American Benevolent Society was one such institution, 
providing assistance to destitutes of both nations. 9 
However the two communities were very much 
distinct entities. North .Americans saw the New World 
as quite different from corrupt and belligerent Europe, 
ascribing to their country's foreign policy in Latin 
.America benevolent and unselfish concerns. Minister 
Osborn praised the old Yankee principles of "no 
entangling alli~~ces and no interference with the 
domestic affairs of other nations 11 • 10 Instead, his 
successor Hanna argued, London usually relied on the 
Egyptian method "of fleets and army, and the physical 
domination of the strong over the weaR". 11 
In the commercial arena British and United 
States merchants were beginning to clash. Great 
Britain was "the bank, stockbroker, railway builder, 
and supplier of the Argentine Republic 11 • 12 During 
1880 she provided 27¾ of that country's imports. 
9Buchanan to Hay, July 7, 1899. Dip. Des. 
Vol.38, no.717 
10osborn to Evarts, July 7, 1880. Dip. Des. 
Vol.23, no.289 
11 Hanna to Bayard, July 29, 1888. Dip. Des. 
Vol.26, no.168 
12 Ferns, H.S. Britain and Argentina in the 
Nineteenth CenturyL (Oxford, 1960) pg.429 
The same year her investments in Argentina totalled 
£23,060,000 - more than twice the value of those in 
Brazil or in Mexioo. 13 Attempts to expand the North 
.American presence on the River Plate therefore were 
viewed with concern by London and resulted in British 
measures to thwart them. 
5. 
At the end of the nineteenth century, however, 
the position of the United States in Argentina was 
weak. Washington had previously shown scant regard 
for that region. During 1831 she refused to take any 
action over England's seizure of the Falkland Islands, 
while thirteen years later the threat of further 
European intervention in Argentine affairs saw 
Secretary of State Buchanan offer only moral support 
to Buenos Aires. On both occasions Argentina's 
leaders expressed their disillusionment with 
la gran republica. 14 
The two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship, 
Navigation and Commerce in 1853, containing a 
conditional most-favoured-nation clause. However 
trade between them remained small. 15 Basic to this was 
13ibid, pg.492 
14Julius Goebel, Jr. The stru~gle for the 
Falkland Islands; A stud, in Le~a.1 an Diplomatic 
Hisiory (New Haven, 192) pg.4 9-462 
15The yearly average value of commerce between 
New York and Buenos Aires 1854-1860 was nearly 
$4,000,000. Of this amount, more than two-thirds was 
in the form of Argentine exports to the United States. 
McGann, Argentina~ the United States and the Inter-
American System 1 80-1914 (Cambridge, 1957) pg.84 
6. 
the competitive nature of the Argentine and North 
American economies. Both lands were endowed with 
temperate climates and rich agricultural potential. 
Consequently they became natural rivals in world trade. 
After the United States Civil War, Republican 
protectionists sought to foster domestic production 
in agriculture and industry. They sponsored the 
American Wool and Woollens Act of 1867, which raised 
Argentine exports. Within a year shipments of that 
commodity to the States fell from 37,000,000 pounds 
16 to 12,500,000. Bitterly resented at Buenos Aires, 
the North .American wool tariff remained for many years 
a major barrier to bilateral trade. 
Instead Argentina looked to the old World to 
sell her produce and supply her needs. During 1881 
Argentine foreign trade amounted to about 100,000,000 
pesos, of which Europe controlled 80 million. 17 The 
influence of habit is strong. Having gained an early 
16Peterson, H.F. Arfentina and the United States 
1810-1960. (State Universi y of New York, 1964) pg.224 
17Baker 1s report of January 16, 1882. Reports 
from the Consuls of the United States on the Commerce, 
Manufacturers etc. of Their Consular Districts. 
commercial Relations of the United states9 (Hereafter cited as Consular Reports) no.17, March 1 82, pg.315 
7. 
foothold in the Argentine m(arket, European countries 
possessed the advantages of established reputations . 
and world-wide distribution agencies. To Buenos Aires, 
the old and tried channels of commercewere the easiest 
and most satisfactory. 18 
Needing capital to open up the rich pampas, 
Argentina sought this also in volwne from across the 
Atlantic. European investment became vital to her 
development and prosperity. British finance 
penetrated all parts of the country and undertook a 
wide range of economic activity. By 1885 United 
Kingdom funds in the Republic s-tood around £45,000,000.19 
In contrast the role played by United States dollars 
continued to be negligible. 
There were other weaknesses in the North American 
position. Washington had failed to develop a regular 
and direct shipping connection with the River Plate. 
After the decline of the clipper ship, the Stars and 
Stripes became a rare sight in Argentine ports. During 
1873 not one United States steamship arrived at Buenos 
Aires. 20 Ten years later the situation was unchanged 
18newitt, Paul, 11 The Commercial Relations Between 
the United States and Argentina". The Southwestern Pol-
itical and Social Science Quarterly, Vol.11 (1930) 
pg.170 
19The Economist, 23 Jan. 1886, pg.105 
20ourtis, W.E., Trade and Transtortation Between 
The United States and Spanish .AmerlcaWashlngton, 1889) 
pg.74-75 
with only some half dozen .American vessels tied up, 
mostly schooners of small tonnage. 21 
s. 
In Argentina, successive Presidents advocated 
government support for a direct steamship line between 
Buenos Aires and New York. During 1865 the Argentine 
Congress had voted an annual subsidy of $20,000 to 
any company making monthly voyages. Thirteen years 
later President Avellaneda renewed the offer. 22 Both 
these efforts; however 7 failed to secure adequate 
backing in the United States. 
Those .American. sailing vessels that did travel 
to Argentina were irregular, slow and went via 
Brazilian ports. In so doing they faced severe 
quarantine restrictions upon arrival at Buenos Aires. 
Instead .American and Argentine exporters favoured the 
long, two way crossing of the Atlantic, via Eu.rope. 
On that route all the European countries had regular 
and rapid sailings. Reported Consul Baker in 1880, 
"Foreign vessels almost exclusively are now doing the 
carrying to and from the States 11 • 23 
21 Article from La Nacion in Baker to Hunter, 
Feb. 8, 1884. National Archives! Department of State 
Records .American Affairs Ar en ina Consular Des atches 
on.Des. 
22osborn to Evarts, Sept. 22, 1880. Dip. Des. 
Vol. 23, no.300. 
23Baker to Hunter, March 6, 1880. Con. Des. 
Vol. 16, no.348 
9. 
The absence of direct steamship communications 
meant mail delivery was equally slow and unreliable. 
Between New York and Buenos Aires lay a distance 
of some 6,300 miles. Even with the best connections 
mail orders could rarely be filled in less than ninety 
days. Moreover merchants frequently complained of 
lost or damaged goods. 24 Minister ·Sherrill wrote, 
"To attempt to force an increase here of .American 
t.T'::irlA in thA face of this handicap is like trying 
to make water run uphi11 11 • 25 
United States businessmen in the Argentine 
Republic lacked other facilities. Until 1914 North 
American law forbade the establishment of branch 
banks abroad. All commercial transactions between 
the two countries therefore had to go through foreign 
banks. As a consequence, they were subject to 
excessive surcharges, not to mention more delay. 
Complained one envoy "the injury done to our trade by 
reason of this condition is marked11 • 26 
24Hanna to Blaine, May 18, 1889. Dip. Des. 
Vol.27, no.233 
25sherrill to Knox, Dec.13, 1909. National 
Archives, Department of Statel Arfentina. Record 
ITrou~ 59 1 Numerlcal File, 190 -19 o. Case 18905. 
no.1 6 
26Buchanan to Olney, Oct.21, 1895. Dip. Des. 
Vol.32, no.162 
10. 
Few North .American firms had established 
offices or personal representatives in the River Plate. 
Instead many sought to solicit business solely by 
letters to the Legation or Consulate. Likewise, to 
publicise United States interests and policy, there 
was no American newspaper at Buenos Aires. In contrast 
the English colony had six, the Italian fourteen, the 
French, German and Russian one. 27 
Perhaps most damaging to improved United States -
Argentine commerce, however, was the absence o:f a sizeable 
North .American community in Argentina. The large number 
of resident Englishmen·;: not only provided a market for 
their country's products, but helped to communicate to 
the native population English conceptions of taste and 
utility. Moreover they were coming to occupy a strategic 
position in the Argentine economy. The increasing 
number of British - directed companies showed a natural 
preference for British goods. As H.S. Ferns points 
out, .American and Belgian locomotives were seen on 
government-owned lines, but not on British lines. 28 
In their attempt to promote trade and overcome 
these obstacles, United States representatives faced an 
uphill struggle. Inadequate funding by Congress meant 
27Martin, P.F. Tfirough Five Republics of South 
America (London, 1905) pg.5 
28Ferns, H.S. Britain and Argentina in the 
Nineteenth Century. (Oxford, 1960) pg.430 
11. 
that diplomatic officers there were both underpaid 
and overworked. Appointees had frequently to draw upon 
private income to meet expenses. 29 Until 1888 the 
Minister Resident remained all alone at his post, 
During that year a Secretary was finally appointed, 
at a salary of $1,500 a year. 
The Oonsular Service suffered equally from 
neglect. In 1883 Consul Baker reported that he was 
compelled to spend $1500 arinually out of his private 
means to make ends meet and that his salary was half 
what other consuls in Buenos Aires received. 
Recommending that the post be raised to the level of 
the Argentine Consulate General in New York, he 
urgently requested clerical assistance. 3° Fourteen 
years later, Baker was still asking for more assistance 
than his one clerk could supply.~1 
The physical appearance of the United States 
Legation and Consulate at Buenos Aires also reflected 
the low priority given to them by the State Department. 




to Hay, Oot.26 1904. Di;e. Des. 
30Baker to Hunter, June 2, 1883. Con. Des. 
Vol. 19, no.564 
31 Baker to Rockhill, Dec. a, 1896. aon. Des. 
Vol. 23, no.11;6 
12. 
"neither table to write on, chair to sit on, nor 
curtains or carpets ••• 1132 The office itself comprised 
11 a single room, 13 x 17 feet, lighted only through 
a glazed door, and situated in a back corridor of a 
residential building with bedrooms on either side 11 • 33 
I 
wrote Pitkin four years later "the contrast between these 
quarters and those of other diplomatic folk has long 
been a matter of unpleasant comment11 • 34 
Consul Baker experienced similar trouble securing 
suitable premises. During 1888 lack of funds forced him 
to place the Consulate within his own residence, while 
the state of its furniture, Baker reported, was so bad 
that he kept it out of sight as much as possible. 35 
Noted his successor 11 there is no other Consulate in this 
City in such a dilapidated condition as this office11 • 36 
Despite these barriers to trade, however, a close 
commercial and political rapprochement between the two 
countries was possible. The United States and Argentine 
Republic had passed through similar phases in their 
historial development, giving rise to the idea of a 
common future. Both were products of revolution against 
32Hanna to Bayard, Dec.a, 1885. DiE• Des. 
Vol. 25, no.15 
33v11as to Blaine, July 13, 1889. Di!!• Des. 
Vol. 27, no._248 
34Pitkin to Blaine, Dec. 7, 1889. Di]?• Des. 
Vol. 28, no.18 
35Baker to Hunter, Oct. 31, 1885. Con. Des. 
Vol. 19, no.684 
3~ayer to Day, Jan. 5, 1898. Con. Des. 
Vol. 23, no.1 
13. 
European colonial powers and, in expanding westwards, 
had shared a feeling of manifest destiny. Each 
suffered internal conflicts during the 1860 1 s and 
1870's as a prelude to forming well defined nation 
states. 
In her institutions and laws A=!;gentina closely 
imitated North .America. During 1853 she adopted the 
United States constitution, while fifty years later 
ex-President Pellegrini studied that country's Pres-
idential election as a basis for further electoral 
reform. 37 When laying the foundations of a public-
school system, Domingo Sarmiento likewise followed 
the North American example and imported hundreds of 
Yankee women teachers. 38 This country, James Bryce 
concluded, 11 is the United States of the Southern 
Hemisphere 11 • 39 
Geographically Argentina also resembled her 
northern neighbour. The Argentine pampas and 
American West were similar in their productive 
capacity. Techniques and machinery were being 
developed in the United States that could easily be 
adapted to River Plate conditions. As a result North 
37Beaupre to Hay, May 2, 1905. Dip. Des. 
Vol. 45, no.151 
38Hanna to Bayard, Nov. 19, 1888. Dip. Des. 
Vol. 27, no.186 
39Bryce, J. South American. Observations and 
Impressions. (London, 1912) pg.315 
14 • 
.American manufacturers enjoyed a natural advantage 
in the supply of barbed wire, mowers, reapers and 
other agricultural implements. 
Perhaps most important to better commercial 
relations between the two countries, however, was 
Argentina's desire for a closer accord with Washington. 
Throughout the 1880's her Chamber of Deputies maintained 
the custom of holding a brief session on each July 
Fourth day and then adjourning as "an act of homage 
to the great Republic 11 • 40 In 1885 a Trade Commissioner 
reported that "nowhere has the Commission met with 
more genuine cordiality, and nowhere has the desire 
for closer political and commercial relations with the 
United States, been so apparent as in the Argentine 
Republic 11 • 41 The next three decades would see 
Washington seek to respond to that desire. 
40Baker to Porter, July 6, 1887. Con. Des. 
Vol. 20, no.767. Also Baker to Wharton, July 8, 1892. 
Con. Des. Vol. 22, no.1017 
41 curtis to Bayard, June 12, 1885. National 
Archives, Department of state Recordst .American affairs, 
Argentina. Despatches Received B~ t e Department of 
State From the u.s. Oommisslon To antral and South 
America. July 141 1884 - December 26, 1885., no.3S 
CHAPTER I 
BEGINNINGS, 1880 - 1890 
The 1880's was a period of political 
consolidation and economic expansion for Argentina. 
The defeat of the portenos,1 the influx of European
capital and the "revolution on the Pampas 112 combined 
to engP.TirlA� a tremendous growth in production and 
prosperity. The length of railways trebled, the 
number of immigrants increased eightfold and the 
export of agricultural products rocketed.3 From
her isolated and backward condition, she emerged as 
11 one of the agricultural powers of the world 11 • 4
Few North American diplomats or consuls sent 
15. 
to Buenos Aires during the eighties failed to perceive 
the potential of the River Plate. Minister Hanna 
1Porteno. A native of the city of Buenos Aires.
211Revolution on the Pam*as". During the eightiesthe scrawny sheep and cattle tat had previously roamed 
the open range were rapidly supplanted by pedigreed 
flocks and herds bred from imported stock and enclosed 
by tight new wire fences. 
3
rn 1879 2,136 kilometers of railroad were built,
in 1889, 6,551. Between 1871 and 1880 90,678 immigrants 
arrived, between 1881 and 1890, the figure was 648,711. 
In 1876, 21 tons of wheat were exported; in 1890, 327,894 
tons. McGann, T.F. Ar entina the United States and 




described the Argentine Republic as "the real El 
Dorado of all the South Atlantic and Pacific States",· 
and referred to the day when she would become "a 
formidable rival of the United States in the production 
of cereals". Wrote he "The South .American States, are 
jast now, probably the most inviting field for the uses 
of capital in the whole world". 5 
Relations between Washington and Buenos Aires 
began the eighties on a promising note. In 1880 the 
North American Minister Osborn offered his good 
offices in Argentina's civil war. Although turned 
down, this action was warmly appreciated by the 
Argentine government and press. Reference was made in 
the newspapers to the fact that after Buenos Aires had 
rebelled against Presidential authority, Minister 
Osborn had retired to Belgrano along with the NationaJ. 
Congress. "The Argentine Government", the Buenos Aires 
Herald stated, "has not gone through one day of trial 
without having the United States Minister at its 
side11 • 6 
5Hanna to Porter, Oct, 23, 1886. Con. Des. 
Vol. 20, no.3. Hanna to Bayard, March 22, 1888. 
Dip. Des. Vol. 26, no.143 
6osborn to Evarts, Nov. 29, 1880. Dip. Des. 
Vol. 23, no.308 
17. 
A year later the North .American representative, 
along with his counterpart in Santiago, played a major 
role in the successful mediation of an Argentine-
Chilean bounctny dispute. 7 The settlement was accept-
able "to the press, the people and all parties" in 
Argentina and caused 11much excitement and rejoi:c-ing1!' 1~ ~ 
As a measure of his country's gratitude, the Argentine 
Minister of Foreign Affairs requested Osborn to accept 
a shield of exquisite workmanship. 9 In an editorial 
the Buenos Aires Standard wrote, 11 No recognition could 
equal the service this gallant officer and his brother 
in Santiago have rendered the two republics 11 • 10 
At the economic level also, the United States 
began the 1880 1 s by demonstrating a desire to become 
more closely involved with her southern neighbour. On 
the 17th September 1880 Colonel W.P. Tisdel, an agent 
of Roach's New York and Brazil steamship Co., arrived 
in the city to examine the feasibility of extending 
the line to Buenos Aires. Aided by the United States 
Minister Resident, he conducted interviews with 
President Avellaneda, the Minister of the Interior 
7Dickens, Paul D. "Argentine Arbitrations and 
Mediations with Reference to United States Participation 
Therein", The His~anic .American Historical Review, 
Vol.11, (1931) pg. 64-484 
8osborn to Blaine, July 1, 1881. Dip. Des. 
Vol.23, no.324 
9osborn to Freylinghuysen, Dec.22, 1883. Dip. 
~ Vol.24, no.399 
10Quoted in Baker to Hunter, June 29, 1881. 
Con. Des. Vol.17, no.437 
18. 
and other high ranking officials. The Argentine 
authorities, Tisdel discovered, "felt the greatest 
interest in the project to draw closer the 
commercial and social ties between the two 
countries through the medium of steam communication 11 • 11 
Two years later the United States participated 
in the Continental Exhibition at Buenos Aires. 
Organised by the Argentine "Club Industrial", the 
Axhibition wa.i=i the first of its type in Latin America. 
All the South American countries apart from Peru and 
Bolivia, were represented. Thus was afforded a golden 
opportunity "of displaying to the people of South 
America the commanding position which the United States 
now occupy in the mechanic arts and the production 
of all kinds of machinery ••• 1112 
Underlying this North American interest in the 
Argentine Republic was the changing nature of trade 
between the two countries. Not only was the volume 
of commerce growing, but there was a significant shift 
in its direction. As in the past, Argentina continued 
to export to the United States hides, linseed and some 
wool. In return the United States sent Argentina timber, 
cloth, cotton and flour. 
11 osborn to Evarts, Sept.22, 1880. Dip. Des. 
Vol.23, no.300 
12Baker to Hunter, Aug.27, 1881. Con. Des. 
Vol.17, no.447 
What changed was that during the eighties 
North American manufactured goods began making 
19. 
their appearance on the River Plate. Agricultural 
implements, industrial machinery, petroleum products 
all found a ready market in the Southern Republic. 
Thus, while Argentina's exports to North .America 
remained much the same, there was a steady growth 
in her imports from that country. Hitherto in favor 
of Argentina, the balance of trade after 1883 
increasingly benefited the United States. 
Table I. Value of Argentine trade with the 
United States {dollars~: 1882 - 1890. 13~ 
Year Argentine Argentine 
Imports Exports 
1882 2,727,917 5,234,914 
1883 3,357,670 6,192,111 
1884 4,825,813 4,110,038 
1885 4,676,501 4,328,510 
1886 4,333,770 5,022,346 
1887 5,671,729 4, 1 oo, 192 
1888 6,099,411 5,902,159 
1889 8,376,077 5,454,618 
1890 8,322,627 5,401,697 
13statistica1 Abstract of the United States, 
Eleventh Number, 1888 (Washington 1889) pg.5 q 
ibid, Fourteenth Number, 1891 (Washington, 1892) 
20. 
Realizing the advantages that would accrue from 
a larger export market, Washington took steps during 
this early period to foster her commerce with Argentina. 
On June 11, 1885, the Latin American Trade Commission, 
appointed by an Act of Congress the year before, arrived 
in Buenos Aires. 14 Its purpose was "to ascertain the 
best mode of securing more intimate international and 
commercial relations between ,the United States and the 
several countries of Central and South America11 • 15 
In line with this, the commissioners passed on 
goodwill messages during a conference with President 
Roca and held interviews with a number of leading 
North American businessmen resident in the Argentine 
capitai. 16 
Other indications pointed to a desire on the part 
of the United States g-overnment for a closer relation-
ship. In their annual messages to Congress, Presiaents 
Arthur, Cleveland and Harrison all spoke of the need for 
direct North American shipping lines to the River Plate.17 
Later on in the decade a Pan American Conference 
was held at Washington to discuss such problems. 
14smith, Joseph. "The Latin American Trade 
Commission of 1884-5". Inter-American Economic Affairs. 
Vol.24 (1971) pg.3-25 
15curtis to Bayard, June 12, 1885. Despatches 
Received By the Department of State From the U:s. 
Commission to Central and South America. Jul 14 1884 -
Decem 8 • no.38 
16ibid. 
17Hanna to Bayard, Dec.12, 1886. Dip. Des. 
Vol.2'(), no.i>(X Hanna to Blaine, April 8, 1889. Dip. 
Des. Vol.27, no.220 -
21 • 
Argentina was invited and a special emissary dispatched 
to visit her and other Latin American countries in 
order to gain support for the idea and ensure 
t . . t. 18 par 1c1pa 10n. 
At Buenos Aires, the status of the United States 
Legation was increased. It had long been a matter of 
comment that Washington had only a Minister Resident 
in the Argentine capital compared to the Plenipotentiar-
10 
ies of other nations.,.., In 1884 Thomas Osborn became 
Minister Resident and Consul General, while three years 
later the post was elevated to that of Envoy Extraordinary 
and Minister Plenipotentiary. 
Washington's growing overtures to the 11 Yankees 
of the South" during this decade were paralleled by a 
desire on the part of the Argentines for greater ties 
with the "Colossus of the Worth11 • Late 1887 the United 
States Minister informed his government of the 
termination of export duties by Argentina. This 
reduction was the more remarkable as that country's 
treasury balances were strained and hard to reconcile. 
18secretary of State Bayard selected John G. 
Walker, the secretary of legation at Bogota, as 
special commissioner to tour Latin America to meet 
possible objections to the conference. 
19Hanna to Bayard, Feb.16, 1888. Dip. Des. 
Vol.26, no.134 
Wrote Bayless Hanna, it was 11 a strong appeal for 
_reciprocity on the part of the United States". 20 
22. 
The following year an influential institution, 
the 11 Commercial Exchange of the Eleventh of September", 
embracing some of the most prominent men in the country, 
was established. Its purpose was to promote commerce 
between the two nations. To this end, Argentine wool 
samples were left at the Legation to be forwarded to 
the United States President and various North 
American manufacturers. 21 
One result of the increasing United States 
involvement with Argentina was to further stimulate 
Anglo-American rivalry on the River Plate. The 1880 1s 
marked a period of international tension between 
London and Washington. Two of the most acrimonious 
issues affecting relations were those of the Alaskan 
boundary dispute and the regulating of the Northern 
furseal fisheries. 22 Other sources of friction 
included British activities during the war of the 
Pacific (1879-83), whioh was seen by Secretary of State 
2OHanna to Bayard, Now. 19, 1887. 
Vol. 26, no.93 
21 Hanna to Bayard, Aug. 20, 1888. 
Vol, 26, no.176 
22see The American Secretaries of 
Their Di¥lomacy. samuel Bemis (ed) (New 









Blaine as "an English war on Peru, with Chile as the 
instrument0 • 23 
In Argentina, North .Americans gazed with envy 
23. 
at the predominance of the English. England,wrote 
Minister Hann0t "has profitably placed millions of money 
here - an opportunity I would like to see shared by 
our people11 • 24 The United States could and should 
interest themselves in investment opportunities. When 
the construction of an elevated railway was pla."1ned 
for Buenos Aires in 1888, a despatch pointed to the 
experience and success of that in New York. "Our 
builders and contractors in the United States should 
make a note of it, and not allow England or Germ8JlY to 
run away with this opportunity to make a valuable 
investment and to advertise the superiority of United 
States mechanical improvements ••••• 11 25 
As a first step to challenging English 
economic hegemony, argued Hanna, the United States 
needed an adequate merchant marine. Line after line 
23Prof. R.A. Humphreys, "Anglo-American Rivalries 
and the Venezuela Crisis of 1895", Transactions of the 
Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series, Vol.17 {1967), 
pg.147-148 
24Hanna to Bayard, Jan. 14, 1888, Dip. Des. 
Vol. 26, no.119 
25Hanna to Bayard, March 16, 1888. Dip. Des, 
Vol. 26, no.140. 
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of European ships to the River Plate were being 
established, 11 but not one of them, so far, carries 
the most majestic flag of all the nations 11 • 26 
Only by direct, regular sailings from New York to Buenos 
Aires could North .American merchants and Manufacturers 
compete. 11 Unless we can afford to bring our products 
here and offer them for sale on equal footing with 
European dealers, we cannot enter the contest of 
exchange with the producers of South .American states". 27 
Also needed was some method of protecting United 
States manufacturers from unfair European trade practices. 
In the absence of a direct shipping line between the 
United states and the River Plate, many North American 
goods were shipped to England and reshipped to the 
Argentine market as English goods. 11 It is a notorious 
fact here", wrote Minister Osborn, "that .American hams, 
cheeses and many other articles of .American products 
find their way to this market as English products ••• 1128 
In consequence London was "diverting {the United States) 
natural trade and leeching its good name 11 • 29 
26Hanna to Bayard, Dec. 12, 1887. DiE• Des. 
Vol. 26, no.102 
27Hanna to Blaine, April 8, 1889. Di!!• Des. 
Vol. 27, no.220 
28osborn to E1varts, Sept. 22, 1880. Di!!• Des. 
Vol. 23, no.300 
29Hanna to Bayard, July 25, 1888. DiE• Des. 
Vol. 26, no.166 
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Britain for her part jealously guarded her 
economic predominance. The prospect of greater North 
.American competition was viewed with some concern. 
When President Cleveland proposed to Congress in 
1885 a modification of tariff laws, it was sufficient 
to bring the British Minister several times to the 
United States Legation, inquiring about the policy 
likely to be adopted. Observed Hanna, "He is evidently 
quite nervous on the subject, which seems significant11 • 30 
Likewise,in 188~ after the departure of the 
Trade Commission, the British Consul Monson lost no 
time in interviewing the Argentine Under Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs. Inquiries centred on the possible 
significance of the visit. While praising the quality 
of luxury goods imported from France, Senor Pelligo 
assured Monson that " •••• in almost everything else 
British goods are and would continue to be, the most 
sought after0 • 31 
Through the English language newspapers, the 
Buenos Aires standard and the Buenos Aires Herald, the 
English community in Argentina disparaged North .American 
attempts to secure a better commercial footing in that 
country. The Trade Commission was termed "ridiculous", 
30Ha.nna to Bayard, Dec. 12, 1886. Dip. Des. 
Vol. 26, no.60 
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offering only "moral influence and assurances of good-
will ••• 1132 In editorials and diplomatic correspondence, 
the spectre of Yankee expansionism was raised. When · 
John G. Walker sought to arouse support for the 
forthcoming Pan-American Conference, he found represent-
atives of a certain European power endeavoring to 
excite fears that the United states was seeking uto 
acquire an undue influence on this continent for 
purely selfish endsn. 33 
On occasions when it looked as if North American 
enterprise was gaining a foothold, the English were 
quick to react. British firms had secured monopolistic 
cable-landing rights in Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina. 
Not only were they able to impose discriminatory 
charges on messages to and from United States exporters, 
but,.more important, they were in a strategic position 
to intercept valuable business information. In 1885 
the Central and South American Telegraph Company won 
a concession to establish one or more submarine telegraph 
cables in the waters of the Argentine Republic. However, 
"much delay was caused by the friends of the European 
line, and a portion of the press here 11 • 34 
32Buenos Aires standard, Feb. 1, 1887. Quoted 
in Hanna to Bayard, ~eb. 1, 1887. Dip. Des. Vol. 26, 
no.69 
33wa1ker to State Department, April 5, 1889. 
Dip. Des. Vol. 27, no.1 
34osborn to Bayard, July 16, 1885. Dip. Des. 
Vol. 25, no.459 
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England was also quick to capitalize on North 
American hesitancy. In 1887 a number of United States 
citizens proposed to operate a line of steamships 
between New York and Buenos Aires. The Argentine 
government agreed to give a subsidy of $(Argentine 
Gold)10,000 per trip, for twelve monthly voyages over 
a period of ten years. 35 However, the North Americans 
"interposed too many suggestions" and an English 
entrepreneur, Robert P. Houston,representing English 
capital, secured the contract. 36 Hanna suspected that 
the British undertaking was strongly flavored with 
intrigue. 11 0ur United States capitalists were very 
near closing a contract with this government for such 
a line, on rational conditions, when this movement, it 
now seems was interposed by estoppal merely11 • 37 
England was not the only country with which 
the United States came into economic conflict in 
Argentina during the eighties. Germany also had "a 
convenient way of appropriating models and selling 
(its) manufactured products as American machinery11 • 38 
35nanna to Bayard, Jan. 1, 1887. Dip. Des. 
Vol. 26, no.65 
36Hanna to Bayard, Nov. 20, 1887. Di;e. Des. 
Vol. 26, no.94 
37Hanna to Bayard, Jan. 9, 1888. Di:E• Des. 
Vol. 26, no.113 
38Hanna to Blaine, May 15, 1889. DiE• Des. 
Vol. 27, no.232 
Increasingly the two nations clashed over Argentine 
railroad contracts, the Germans preferring to 0 work 
at a loss in this instance for the foothold it will 
give themu. 39 
However, if North American competitiveness 
28. 
grew 1880 - 1890, it was still in a position of weakness 
at the end of the decade. Washington's commercial 
importance to Buenos Aires remained far behind that of 
other countries. In the first six months of 1889 
Argentina's foreign trade amounted to 166,119,780 gold 
pesos. Of this England had approximately one-third, 
France more than one-fifth, Germany more than one-
tenth and the United States only one-twelfth. 40 
Likewise North .American capital investment 
in the River Plate remained almost nonexistent during 
the 1880's. Little or no United States dollars went 
into Argentine public funds, while the number of 
American-owned enterprises in Buenos Aires stayed 
comparatively small. Argentine statistics for 1887 
showed 257 English houses in the city employing a 
capital of $121,952,000. In comparison there were 
only twenty six North .American business places worth 
a mere $2,189,900. 41 
39Hanna to Bayard, Feb. 5, 1887. Dip. Des. 
Vol. 26, no.70 
40Baker•s report of Aug. 23, 1889. Consular 
Reports, no.108, Sept. 1889, pg.166 
41 Quoted in Hanna to Bayard, Nov. 28, 1887. 
Dip. Des. Vol. 26, no.97 
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The major impediments t0 an increase in commerce 
and capital from the United States, were still 
inadequate shipping facilities and restrictive 
tariff laws. During 1883 forty six steamships 
arrived in the Plate, none of which were from North 
America. 42 Six years later the situation had not 
changed when Minister Hanna reported "I have never 
seen a United States merchant steamer carrying our 
r,,...,.._ _, .,..-1-A 
VUJ.J.\.i.J.U.UvU 
La Nacion " ••••• without a direct line with the United 
States, .American enterprise, brains and capital, are 
but a dream11 • 44 
North .American protectionism remained a similar 
stumbling block to healthy commercial relations. 
During 1885 Argentina's exports of wool amounted to 
$35,950,000, of which the United States purchased only 
45 $1,180,000. The same year President Cleveland called 
for a modif'ication of tariff schedules, causing "much 
42La Nacion, Feb. 7, 1884 in Baker to Hunter, 
Feb. 8, 1884. Con.Des. Vol., 19, no.599. 
43Hanna to Blaine, April 11, 1889. Dip. Des. 
Vol. 27, no.222 
44-ria Nacion, Feb. 7, 1884 in Baker to Hunter 
Feb. 8, 1884. Con. Des. Vol. 19, no.599 
45Hanna to Bayard, Feb. 23, 1887. Dip. Des. 
Vol. 26, no.74 
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rejoicing and very general comment" on the part of 
Argentine producers. 46 However this resulted only 
in the abortive Mills bill two years later. "The 
people in the States", Argentina's representative at 
Washington argued, "are willing to take but not to give; 
the Republicans want our consuming powers, but will not 
budge an inch to make reciprocal concessions 11 • 47 
In 1887 Minister Hanna described the North 
.American duty on un,--,ashed ,.l1ool as a "p~1 pable ~:rid 
unjust discrimination against a sister republic of 
our own continent, struggling against many hindrances 
to follow in the footsteps of the United States •••• 11 • 48 
A year later he again decried the exclusion of wool. 
Wrote Hanna, "whether the United states shall care 
practically to cultivate closer relations, is 
exclusively a matter for its people and government. 
But if it is attempted, I doubt whether we can shut 
our ports against its chief products and succeed".49 
However, despite these barriers, the basis of a vital 
political and economic relationship between Washington 
46Hanna to Bayard, Dec.12, 1886. Dip. Des. 
Vol. 26, no.60 
47Reported in Buenos Aires Standard, Hanna to 
Bayard, July 31, 1888. Dip. Des. Vol. 26, no.172 
48nanna to Bayard, Nov.19, 1887. Dip. Des. 
Vol. 26, no.93 
49Hanna to Bayard, Feb. 23, 1887. Dip. Des. 
Vol. 26, no.74 
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and Buenos Aires had been laid by 1886. The expansion 
which European investment in Argentina during the early 
eighties had engendered, had opened up opportunities 
for United States expertise and enterprise. By the end 
of the decade North Americans had gained an unquestion-
ably strong position in the supply of certain essential 
goods. Already they had the market for kerosene and 
were selling considerable quantities of lumber and 
barbed wire. 
As early as 1882 the Secretary of the British 
Legation reported that all agricultural implements in 
the provinces of Rosario and Buenos Aires "were from 
the United states, as was likewise nearly all the 
agricultural machinery 11 • 5° Four years later an 
Exposition at Buenos Aires to promote Argentine farming 
included some of the latest improvements in North 
American equipment. There prizes were awarded for the 
most meritorious exhibits. Wrote Consul Baker "It is 
sufficient to say that the United states crone out with 
:'.full honors 11 • 51 
In the field of railroad supplies, North America 
was up against the natural preference on the part of 
British companies for British goods. On government 
owned lines, however, her locomotives and wagons: 
50The Economist, Feb.18, 1882. pg.196 
51 Baker to Hunter, Aug. 18, 1886. Con. Des. 
Vol. 20, no.724 
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were seen with increasing frequency. When the Andean 
Railroad was inaugurated in 1885, Minister Osborn noted 
it was "with peculiar national pride 11 that he witnessed 
most of the Government Party introduced for the first 
time to Pullman Sleepers. 52 Likewise two years later 
Balwin Locomotive Co., who had sold fire engines 
previously in Argentina, secured an order for a further 
twelve. 53 
An indication of things to come was th~ growing 
interest of United States breeders in the Argentine 
livestock industry. The first ventures with North 
American horses to Argentina found 11 a very ready market", 
while there were increasing sales of Vermont merino 
sheep. In 1888 a herd of pedigree Hereford cattle 
from an old established Michigan breeding farm arrived 
at Buenos Aires. So well satisfied were the parties, 
the United States Consul reported, that they proposed 
at once to make further shipments. 54 
In the second half of the decade North Americans 
were also showing a greater readiness to become more 
closely involved with major projects on the River Plate. 
During 1888 c.v. Boisot installed Edison's electric 
52osborn to Bayard, April 20, 1885. Dip. Des. 
Vol. 25, no.450 
53Hanna to Bayard, Feb. 5, 1887. Dip. Des. 
Vol. 26, no.70 
54Baker to Rivas, Feb. 6, 1888. Con. Des. 
Vol. 20, no.796 
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lamps for the first time in Buenos Aires. 55 A year 
later a United States citizen developed the Wheeler 
Plan providing for better harbour and sewerage facilities 
in the city's port. 56 This incvol~ement, however, was 
primarily at the promotional level. When a New York 
civil engineer constructed a railroad from the Argentine 
dapital to Cordoba in 1888, the specifications called 
for "English steel and English iron11 .~7 
Most impo..1rtantly North American manufacturars 
and merchants were seeking to acquire a greater 
knowledge of the South Republic. "This Legationr: 11 , 
the United States Minister reported in 1886, "has been 
greatly besieged recently, with inquiries from almost 
ever:y trading centre of the United States • • • abo11t 
the development and capacity of the.Argentine nation, 
and its relative importance to other South American 
countriesu. 58 Throughout North .America, newspapers and 
periodicals were featuring articles on the pampa 
economy. When one of them, Harpers' Monthly Magazine, 
published a highly optimistic account in November 1887, 
it was sufficient to cause a steady stream of poor North 
55Hanna to Bayard, May 3, 1888. Dip. Des. 
Vol. 26, no.152 
56Hanna to Blaine, March 19, 1889. Dip. Des. 
Vol. 27, no.208 
57The New York Times. Nov. 29, 1887. pg.1, 
column 6 
58Hanna to Porter, Oct. 23, 1886. Con. Des. 
Vol. 20, no.3 
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.American migrants- to Argentina in search of a better 
life. 59 
During the 1880 1 s, the United States was 
tentatively beginning,._ to probe the Argentine market. 
Her products were to be found there in increasing 
numbers, witnessed by an upturn in trade figures 
between the two countries and a growing economic 
rivalry with Great Britain for Argentina's commerce. 
Prior to 1890, however, the North .American presence on 
the River Plate was marked by the lack of its size and 
the almost complete absence of capital. Moreover, 
since 1853 there had been no formal commercial 
treaty between Washington and Buenos Aires. It was 
to this problem that United states diplomats addressed 
themselves in the 1890's. 




THE SEARCH FOR RECIPROCITY, 1890 - 1900 
During 1890 the Baring Crisis burst over 
Argentina. Debt payments were temporarily suspended, 
the banking structure collapsed and revolution broke 
out. Total foreign trade fell from 254,719,239 gold 
pesos in 1889 to 170,426,780 in 1891. 1 Predicted the 
United States Consul at Buenos Aires, "For a long time, 
I fear, the Argentine Republic must continue to dwell 
in the valley of humiliation". 2 
The Crisis adversely affected North .American 
attempts to penetrate the Argentine market. In 1889 
commerce between the two countries was valued at 
$14,748,474. By 1891 this had decreased to $8,796,579. 3 
That yea:r Consul Baker reported "For weeks there has 
not been an .American vessel in port and none are 
expected11 • 4 
1Baker's report of Nov. 17, 1890. Consula:r 
Reports, no.124, January 1891, pg.40 
2Baker, to Wharton, Oct. 5, 1890. Con. Des. 
Vol,21, no.920 
3statistical Abstract of the United States, 1906 
(Washington, 1907), pg.217 
4Baker to Windim, May 22, 1891. Con. Des. 
Vol.22, no.970 
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To meet its debt obligations, austere financial 
measures were adopted by the Argentine g·overnment. 
During January 1891 export duties were reimposed, 
while in December an: exceptionally high tax was levied 
on all foreign life insurance companies. Two North 
.American companies, the Equitable Life Assurance Society 
of the United States and the New York Life Insurance 
Company, had recently established branch offices in 
Buenos Aires plus a considerable number of agents. 
Both were forced to close their doors and suspend 
business. 5 
Many of the North American migrants who had gone 
to Argentina to seek their fortune were reduced to great 
poverty. Consul Baker reported the United States 
Consulate to be overrun by persons, a large number of 
whom were United States citizens, 11 begging for a ·soup 
ticket or a nights lodging". 6 In 1890 the Anglo-
American Benevolent Society of Buenos Aires repatriated 
eleven such people. The following year this society 
paid the passages home of thirteen destitute families. 7 
5Pitkin to Blaine, Feb.5, 1891. Dip. Des. 
Vol.28, no.94. Also Baker to Wharton, Feb.4, 1891. 
Con. Des. Vol.22, no.952 
6Baker to Windim, May 22, 1891. Con. Des. 
Vol.22, no.970 
7consul Bridgett to Salisbury, Nov.9, 1891. 
Miscellaneous Series, no.216, pg.31. British 
Parliamentar Pa ers on Central and South America 
18 0-18 9. Herea er 01 ed as Br1 • Par. Papers) 
The Irish University Press Area Studies Series, Irish 
University Microfilms, 1974. 
37. 
However the Baring Crisis created as well as 
destroyed opportunities for North .American enterprise. 
In July 1890 the Argentine Vice-President informally 
raised the possibility with the American Minister of 
a large silver loan from the United states and discussed 
a "metallic alliance" with that country. Pitkin 
responded enthusiastically. Such an undertaking, he 
reported to Washington, would not only stimulate North 
American involvement on the Fiver Plate, but create 
"a heartier Argentine disposition to fellowship with 
us ••• 11 Consequently the Minister requested a leave 
of absence for a month to promote the idea in the 
states. 8 
After a year in which the Argentine economy de-
teriorated still further, Pellegrini, now President, 
raised the idea with Pitkin of a North American bank 
in Argentina. According to the Argentine plan, it 
would possess a capital of fifty million dollars, open 
branches throughout the country and be free from all 
government interference and taxes. Again the United 
States Minister was interested, He pointed out to his 
superiors that now would be the ideal time for North 
American capitalists to become involved as they could 
substantially command their own terms. The Argentine 
8Pitkin to Blaine, July 13, 1890, Dip. Des. 
Vol.28, telegram unnumbered. Pitkin to Blaine, July 20, 
1890. Dip, Des. Vol.28, no.67, Also Hodge, J. 
"Carlos Pellegrini and the Financial Crisis of 1890". 
Hispanic .American Historiaal Review, Vol.50 (1970) 
pg.519-521 
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people we_re 11 alienated from England to a notable 
degree" and sought financial assistance from "the 
Great Republic 11 • 9 
At least one United States financier responded 
favourably. In 1891 J.S. Morgan & Co. of London 
signed an agreement with Buenos Aires for an 
emergency credit of ~t74,400,000. The national 
railroads stood as guarantee for the loan. Since 
J.P. Morgan in Naw York already controlled the London 
office, Argentina was in reality dealing with a North 
American firm. 10 
That Washington did not encourage further 
involvement in Argentine finances was largely due 
to her preoccupation with other regional matters. In 
Chile she beca.me embroiled in local party strife. As 
a result of an assault by a Ohilean mob upon sailors 
of the u.s.s. Baltimore, President Harrison had sent 
an ultimatum to Santiago on 25th January, 1892. 11 
Although possessed of larger interests elsewhere, 
9Pitkin to Blaine, June 2, 1891. Di~. Des. 
Vol.29, cablegram. Pitkin to Blaine, June, 1891. 
Dip. Des. Vol.29, no.132 
1°Ferrer, Ja.mes. "United States - Argentine 
Economic Relations 1900-1930 11 • Ph.D. Thesis 
(University of California, 1964) pg.20 
11 The .American Secretaries of State and Their 
Diplomac~. Samuel Bemis (ed) (New York, i92>8) vol.VIII, 
pg.157-1 3 
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however, the United States did not neglect Argentina. 
Throughout the nineties all North American representatives 
at Buenos Aires were aware of that country's growing 
economic and political power. Not only was she becoming 
more and;more "a direct and vigorous competitor of the 
United States" in the production of foodstuffs, but 
Argentine statesmen were exerting an increasing 
influence over other Latin American countries. 12 
.diplomat believed, "is unquestionably 
destined to become the controlling power of this 
continent 11 • 13 
From early on in the decade, therefore, there 
were attempts to draw the Republic into the orbit of 
North .American influence. On the 16th March, 1892 the 
South Atlantic Squadron arrived at La Plata. It had 
long been an affront to.A!t'gentine pride that United 
States naval power was concentrated at Montevideo, 
not Buenos Aires. 14 The squadron's visit gave the 
opportunity to both appease wounded sensibilities and 
demonstrate North .American material advancement. 
Reported the United States Minister, its presence "has 
been of wholesome import and its Admiral has won golden 
12Buchanan to Olney, August 18, 1896. Dip. Des. 
Vol.33, no.245 
13Jones to Hay, Aug.3, 1899. Dip. Des. Vol.38, 
no.730 
14:eitkin to Blaine, Jan.25, 1892. Dip. Des. 
Vol.29, no.178 
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opinions on every side". 15• 
However, it was in the field of commercial 
diplomacy that Washington directed her main endeavor. 
Through the McKinley Act of 1891 Secretary of State 
Blaine sought greater access to South .American markets. 
Sugar, molasses, tea, coffee and hides were placed on 
the free list, while duties were threatened against 
any nation which treated North American goods unequally. 
In the case of Argentina many of her products entered 
the United States duty free. The .American Minister 
at Buenos Aires therefore was directed to work for a 
reciprocal trade agreement. 
Pitkin first broached the subject during 
October, 1891. The Argentine Foreign Minister argued 
a commercial treaty with the United States would not 
only vid~ate Argentina's most-favoured-nation treaties 
with European countries, but provoke retaliation by their 
governments. 16 In reply Pitkin warned that should an 
agreement not be reached, a one and one-half cent per 
pound duty on Argentine hides entering the United States 
would be imposed. To soften the threat he added the 
North American government only wanted to strengthen the 
commercial, political and social relations between the 
two republics and promised liberal encouragement to 
15Pitkin to Blaine, March 28, 1892. Dip. Des. 
Vol.30, no.187 
16Pitkin to Blaine, Oct.7, 1891. Dip. Des. 
Vol.29, no.156 
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a line of first-class steamers between New York and 
Buenos Aires. 17 
Faced with a declining source of revenue and his 
, 
government on the verge of bankruptcy, Zeballos was in 
no position to concede liberal import duties. The 
Foreign Minister accused the United States of having 
neglected the Argentine market and threatened to tax 
imports of North .American woods or go further and 
renounce the Friendship a.~d Commercial Treaty of 1853. 
However, in return for free hides and wool, he stated, 
Argentina was prepared to make concessions on certain 
United States imports. 18 
Argentine opposition was not the only obstacle 
Pitkin met in negotiating a commercial treaty. Through-
out his dealings with government authorities, the North 
American Minister became aware of the keen interest 
which other diplomats at Buenos Aires took in the 
proceedings. During May 1892 he reported that the 
European powers were very hostile to any United States-
Argentine Commercial Treaty. Moreover, that the 
resident English, French, German and Italian represent-
atives quickly discovered his efforts for reciprocity 
and stoutly combatted them - "even with threats on the 
part of the first three Ministers." 19 
17Pitkin to Blaine, Jan.9, 1892. DiE• Des. 
Vol.29, no.175 
18Pitkin to Blaine, Dec.29, 1891. DiE• Des. 
Vol.29, no.172 
19Pitkin to Blaine, Jan,20, 1892. Di§. Des. 
Vol.29, no.177. Pitkin to Blaine, May 30, 1 92. 
Dip. Des. Vol,30, no.199 
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By the end of 1892 Washington had failed to obtain 
a new trade agreement with Argentina. In return for the 
free entry of all Argentine hides and skins into the 
United States, Buenos Aires would remove only her 
duties on North American woods and agricultural 
machinery. 20 Two years later, however, the Cleveland 
administration passed the Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act, which 
lifted the barrier against foreign wools. The value 
the United States 
from $3,499,030 in 1894 to $7,675,270 in 1895. 21 Once 
again the North .American Legation at Buenos Aires was 
authorized by the State Department to seek tariff 
modifications. 
Initially Foreign Minister Eduardo Costa had 
expressed Argentine willingness to reciprocate and 
grant equality to United States goods. 22 However, 
prior to the removal of the wool duty, Washington 
failed to secure any definite trade concessions. When 
in late 1894 the newly - arrived United States Minister 
William Buchanan came to negotiate reduced tariff 
rates, he was told Argentina considered herself under 
no obligation to do so. The Argentine stance was 
based on the belief that North American goods were 
20Pitkin to Foster, July 11, 1892. DiE. Des. 
Vol.30, no.205. Pitkin to Foster, July 12, 1 92. 
Dip. Des. Vol.30, telegram 
21 Buchanan's report of June 15, 1897. Consular 
Reports, no.206, November 1897, pg.413 
22Buchanan to Gresham, June 20, 1894. Dip.Des. 
Vol.31, no.28 
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already generously treated and the fact that 75% 
of the Republic's revenues came from its Custom House. 23 
Buchanan responded by pointing out that many 
government statistics on trade with the United States 
were erroneous. Moreover_ that Washington allowed 73% 
of Argentine goods to enter the United States without 
duty, whereas Buenos Aires admitted only 6% of North 
American products untaxed. 24 His efforts, however, 
achieved little. No new convention was signed between 
the two countries. The 1895 Argentine tariff contained 
some slight reductions on petroleum, fa:rm wagons, 
canned goods and other items of small export volume, 
but raised or left untouched the duty on such goods 
as fa:rm machinery and lumber, the principal North 
American exports. 25 
Having failed to secure a commercial treaty, 
the United States looked for other means with which 
to enter the Argentine market. In 1896 a group of 
twenty businessmen representing the National Associat-
ion of Manufacturers visited Argentina to study 
commercial opportunities. There they met with the 
President, the Ministers of Finance and Foreign Affairs, 
as ,.,,ell as the heads of Boards of- Trade and leading 
commercial houses. 26 Their conclusion was that for 
23Buchanan to Gresham, Aug.13, 1894. Dip. Des. 
Vol.31, no.49 
24ibid 
25Buchanan to Gresham, Oct.5, 1894. Dip. Des. 
Vol.31, no.63 
26Fishback to Olney, Oct.6, 1896. Dip. Des. Vol. 
33, letter 
North .American trade with the River Plate to expand, 
better banking and shipping facilities were needed. 
To achieve this, a spokesman for the group promised 
11 ••• every influence at our command in the United 
States ••• " would be used. 27 
44. 
Washington was fortunate at this time in the 
quality of her representatives at Buenos Aires. Both 
Minister Buchanan and Consul Baker were highly 
regarded in Argentine social and government circles. 
Buchanan's personal friendship with Foreign Mini st.er 
Alcorta and skilled diplomacy did much to offset 
Yankee-phobia during the tariff controvercyand saw 
him elected Dean of the Diplomatic Corps. Baker'.s 
commercial reports home were detailed and well-informed, 
and resulted in him holding his office for almo$t 
twenty years. During one Fourth of July celebration, 
the Buenos Aires Herald editorialized "Seldom, if ever, 
has the United States been so ably represented as at 
present 11 • 28 
The North .American Legation in the Argentine 
capital worked hard to encourage closer relations 
between the two countries. To promote trade, Minister 
Buchanan initiated a fortnightly circular, which was 
27Buchanan to Olney, Aug.22, 1896. Dip. Des. 
Vol.33, no.248 
28Buenos Aires Herald, July 5, 1894. Reported 
in Buchanan to Gresham, July 6, 1894. Dip. Des. Vol.31, 
no.35 
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sent to the Department of Agriculture at Washington. 
It contained such detailed information as the average 
gold rate, the sales of livestock and agricultural 
produce and the outlook for the ~oming harvest. 29 
Wrote the Minister,"I fully believe that by earnest 
efforts and by studying the requirements of the 
country and the competition we have to meet we can 
largely increase our trade here each year". 30 
Buchanan was active in other areas. Having 
studied the market conditions thoroughly, he became 
convineed North .American manufacturers could secure 
many g}overnment contracts were they to know of them. 
The details of these contract~ however, were published 
only in Europe and bids received only by the Argentine 
Legation at London. To rectify this the Minister 
made representations for their simultaneous publication 
in the United States. 31 
Foreign Minister Alcorta was willing to oblige. 
On July 30th 1897 details of a g-overnment contract for 
the construction of a new Oentral Railway Station in 
29For example Buchal)Sll· _ to Gresham, June 7, 
1894. Dip. Des. Vol.31, no.24 
30Buchanan to Olney, Jan 18, 1897. Dip. Des. 
Vol.34, no.293 
31 Buchanan to Olney, Feb,17, 1897. Dip. Des. 
Vol.34, no.311 
46. 
Buenos Aires were sent to the Argentine Legation at 
Washington. Their publication was "for the use and 
information of American contractors who may desire to 
submit bids for the work proposed 11 • 32 A month later 
similar details were made known of a plan to pave the 
Argentine capital with asphalt. "This is the first 
time", a jubilant Buchanan informed his superiors, 
11 such proposals have ever been asked for in the United 
'7'7 
States by this Government". :r.J 
To lend prestige to his country's national 
interests, the Minister also worked for a greater 
United States naval presence in Argentina. With small 
commercial interests and few North American citizens 
in Uruguay, the permanent stationing of the South 
Atlantic Squadron there no longer seemed justified. 
At Buenos Aires its ships would not only obtain 
excellent docking facilities, but aid "the important 
~ommercial interests we desire to foster and encourage 
here •••• 1134 As a consequence of this recommendation, 
the Squadron's Admiral was directed by the Navy Depart-
ment to make longer and more irequent visits to the 
32Buohanan to Sherman, Aug.2, 1897. Dip. Des. 
Vol.34, no.376 
33ibid; also Buchanan to Sherman, Aug.9, 1897. 
Dip. Des. Vol.34, no.378 
34Buchanan to Sherman, Oct.22, 1897. Dip. Des. 
Vol.35, no.414 
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Argentine capital. 35 
The success of these efforts may be gauged both 
from official trade figures and the commercial reports 
of British Consuls. In 1895 combined trade between 
the United States and the Argentine Republic amounted 
to $12,131,435 - an increase of $3,334,854 over that 
36 
in 1891. :More importantly the North American share 
of the Argentine import market had grown from 6% to 
n Ard 37 
O • J70• 
This was paralleled by a growing awareness on 
the part of British Consuls that United States business-
men were gaining ground in Argentina. Reference was 
increasingly made in their reports not only to the 
cheapness and adaptability of North American machinery, 
but to the trained machinists sent to sell and demonstrate 
them. During a trip through the wheat districts in 
Entre Rios, British Consul Bridgett constantly found 
United States commercial travellers supervising the 
working of their machines. In contrast he never saw 
a single traveller for any British firm. 38 
35Jones to Sherman, Jan.30, 1898. Dip. Des. 
Vol.35, no.450 
36statistical Ab~tract of the. United States, 
1906 (Washington, 1907), pg.217 
37welby to Salisbury, Nov.20, 1892. Brit. 
Parl. Papers. Report For The Year 1892 On the General 
Condition of The Argentine Republic, pg.91. Also 
Ferrer, op. cit., pg.18 
38Pakenham to Kimberley, April 6, 1894. Brit. 
Parl. Papers. Report For The Year 1893 on The Trade Of 
The Argentine Republic, pg.4 
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To the Foreign Office this was of major concern. 
Like the previous decade, the 1890's was one of Anglo-
.American discord. In 1894 Washington viewed with 
misglvings British intervention in Nicaragua, while 
the following year President Cleveland invoked the 
Monroe Doctrine over the Venezuelan boundary dispute, 
thereby raising the possibility of armed conflict with. 
Great Britain. To develop Latin America as her sphere 
prepared to pursue a vigorous foreign policy. "The 
path which we should follow lies clear before us 11 , 
Senator Lodge declared in December, 1895, "we must be 
the leaders in the Western Hemisphere. We must 
protect our coasts and hold the commerce of that 
hemisphere11 • 39 
In Argentina during the nineties there was a 
continuation of the trade rivalry between Washington 
and London. The United States Minister reported that 
the attitude of English merchants and shippers to Free 
Wool had been unfriendly and anxious. Moreover,that 
there was great concern in Buenos Aires least the 
Argentine import market come under North American 
controi. 40 Predicted ex-President Pellegrini, "If 
39Quoted in Humphreys, "Anglo-American Rivalries 
and the Venezuela Crisis of 1895 11 , Transactions of the 
Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series. Vol.17 (1967) 
pg.146-147 
40Buchanan to Gresham, July 3, 1894. Dip, Des. 
Vol.31, no.34 
American industries continue to grow as up to the 
present, they will need new markets, and to get 
hold of these markets England must be dislodged 0 • 41 
49. 
Throughout·. the decade the British press in 
Argentina attacked United states foreign policy. 
During 1895 the Buenos Aires Standard supported 
Pellegrini in his stand against dleveland's use of the 
Monroe Doctrine. It held that no European power, 
_,....,,..+_.: _, .,..,. --+ Ll-.--, --A 
\..it::..L 110..LU.L,Y HU u .C,!10 ..Ld..lJ.Uf posed a threat to 
Hemisphere nations. 42 Three years later when Washington 
was fighting Spain, the Buenos Aires Herald criticized 
the new belligerency of the United States. An editor-
ial warned, 11 •••• it ushers in the appearance of a new 
colonizing power in an Imperial Republic 11 • 43 
In 1899 the United States Charge d'Affaires 
at Buenos Aires reported that rumours were being 
circulated by the European press of a :sou th American 
alliance against Yankee imperialism. Their purpose 
was nto incite among the South American countries an 
apprehension that we desire to control them". This, 
Jones wrote,was in keeping with "a policy of longstand-
ing directed against us by Europe in these countries". 
41 Quoted in The Buenos Aires Standard, Dec.24, 
1895. Buchanan to Olney, Dec.26, 1895. Dip. Des. 
Vol.32, no.184 
42.b'd 1. 1. • 
43Buenos Aires Herald Dec.4, 1898. Reported 
in Buchanan to Hay, Dec.5, 1998. Dip. Des. Vol.37, 
no.585 
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European powers looked with disfavor at the United 
States' increasing trade relations with Latin America. 
"They recognize that it is a large commercial battle-
field whereon we are liable ±n time to seriously injure 
them, if not to entirely defeat them 11 • 44 
On this battlefield, Washington and London were 
clashing with increasing frequency. During 1892 the 
British Rio de la Plata Telegraph Company, who possessed 
exclusive cable rights between Argentina and Brazil 
imposed discriminatory charges on messagesto North 
.America. Its purpose was "to impair communication 
with the United States" and in this the Company had 
the assistance of the British Legation. 45 For the next 
seven years North .American diplomatic officers at 
Buenos Aires continually sought redress. However, 
although they were aided by the Argentine government, 
the discrimination was maintained. 46 
In 1895 the manager of the London and River Plate 
Bank refused to buy all types of United States exchange. 
The reason given was the belief that Washington would 
soon suspend all gold payments. With no North American 
bank in Buenos Aires, United States citizens were unable 
44Jones to Hay, Aug.3, 1899. Dip. Des. Vol.38, 
no.730 
45Buchanan to Olney, Oct.23, 1895. Di~. Des. 
Vol.32, no.164. Buchanan to Olney, Feb.12, 1 97. 
Dip. Des. Vol.34, no.307 
46Buchanan to Olney, Oct.10, 1896. Dip. Des. 
Vol.33, no.264 
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to convert American dollars into Argentine currency. 
Their only means of engaging in trade became to keep 
accounts in London. 47 The result was to make business 
transactions with the Northern Republic "unsatisfactory, 
slow and unpleasant 11 • 48 
Finally, in 1899, the United States Legation 
at Buenos Aires reported that 11 arbitra.ryJhigh and 
unelastic" freight rates were being levied on North 
American goods travelling to Argentina. This 
stemmed from monopolistic rate-fixing by the three 
British shipping companies operating between New York 
and Buenos Aires. Many United states industrial 
products which were manufactured more cheaply than 
those in England became far more expensive after the 
cost of freight. Again the result was to adversely 
affect trade relations between the two countries. 49 
To meet this harassment Minis)ter Buchanan 
advocated greater effort by and support for North 
American businesses in Argentina. A prime necessity. 
was for a United States bank to open a branch office 
47Buchanan to Gresham, Feb.5, 1895. Dip. Des. 
Vol.31, no.94 
48Buchanan to Olney, Oct.21, 1895. Dip. Des. 
Vol.32, no.162 
49Buchanan to Hay, Jan.18, 1899. Dip. Des. 
Vol.37, no.614 
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there. Such an enterprise would free her commerce 
from 11 the mercy of foreign banks, who, by refusing to 
buy our exchange, cast discredit on our national and 
commercial probity and honor11 .5Q Of equal importance, 
the Minister argued, was for the Central and South 
.American Telegraph Company to secure the necessary 
landing rights and lay its own cable between Argentina 
and Brazil. "Nothing short of that will put them on 
a firm footing here or protect them from the continual 
danger of being harassed •••• 1151 
Perhaps, however, the most pressing need was for 
a United states mercantile marine to be established. 
With no competition, English·companies could maintain 
their high and arbitrary freight costs. North 
American ships would not only offer cheaper rates, 
but provide quicker and more regular sailings. In so 
doing they would draw "by natural means these south 
American countries nearer to the United states than 
to Europen. 52 
Under the Wilson tariff, Washington had made few 
inroads into the Argentine market. She had, however, 
not abandoned hope for a trade agreement. During 1897 
5OBuchanan to Gresham, Feb.5, 1895. Dip. Des. 
Vol.31, no.94 
51 Buchanan to Olney, Aug.24, 1896. Dip. Des. 
Vol.33, no.249 
52Jones to Sherman, Feb.3, 1898. Dip. Des. 
Vol.35, no.454. Also Buchanan to Hay, Jan.18, 1899. 
Dip. Des. Vol.37, no.614 
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the newly elected McKinley administration passed the 
Dingley Tariff. It not only reimposed duties on wool 
but raised them to new levels and made hides dutiable 
for the first time in twenty-five years. Once again 
provisions to negotiate a commercial treaty were written 
into the law. 
Initially, though, North .American efforts were 
directed less at tariff negotiation, than at minimizing 
the spirit of retaliation that pervaded Buenos Aires. 
Believing the United States tariff was aimed specific-
ally at Argentine wool, the Sociedad Rural and other 
influential bodies heavily criticised the measure. 
Porteno newspapers pressed the government to take 
reprisals against that country's imports. 53 
Consequently at the end of 1897 the Uriburu administrat-
ion recommended to Congress huge increases in the 
duties on lumber and agricultural implements. 54 
The United States Minister at Buenos Aires 
worked hard to avoid this. Throughout the weeks of 
debate, Buchanan conferred with sympathetic members 
of Congress almost daily as well as with the Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs and Finance. He argued that the 
value of wool imported into North America was an 
53Buchanan to Sherman, March 20, 1897. Di:e. Des. 
Vol.34, no.320 
54Buchanan to Sherman, Sept.15, 1897. DiJ2• Des. 
Vol.35, no.394 
54. 
exceeding large item and therefore a good field for 
raising revenue. Moreover, that Argentine wool was but 
a small portion of the total quantity of imported 
wool and thus not specifically singled out by the 
United States tariff. Largely as a result of these 
arguments, Buchanan believed, the Exe cu ti ve:• s 
recommendations were not implemented. 55 
In his despatches home the North American 
D1inister urged the time was nON ripe to conclude a 
reciprocity agreement with Argentina. As a basis for 
negotiation, he suggested a liberalization of the 
United States duty on sugar. The remarkable growth 
of that industry in Tucuman province had led to 
overproduction and the formation of a huge sugar 
surplus. Consequently the necessity of finding an 
overseas outlet had become acute. 56 By allowing 
liberal access to the rich North American market, 
Buchanan argued, Washington would gain "without any 
shadow of doubt, delay or discussion, distinct 
advantages to our commerce with this country ••• and 
at the same time create here a kindly sentiment in our 
favor 11 • 57 
55Buchanan to Sherman, Nov.23, 1897. Di9. Des. Vol.35, no.422. Buchanan to Sherman, Jan.8, 18 8. 
Dip. Des. Val..35, no.434 
56Buchanan to Sherman, June 3, 1897. Dip. Des. 
Vol.34, no.354. Buchanan to Sherman, June 15, 1897. 
Dip. Des. Vol.34, no.359 
57Buchanan to Olney, Feb.16, 1897. Dip. Des. 
Vol.34, no.310 
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On December 9th 1898 the United States 
Legation at Buenos Aires received authorization to 
negotiate a commercial treaty. Trade talks began and 
continued through to the following year. Although 
Minister Buchanan reached early agreement with Foreign 
Minister Alcorta, other members of the Argentine 
Cabinet were more hesitant. They continually 
objected to the wool classification system used by 
Washington and her alleged discrimination against 
Argentine skirted wools. Also of concern was the 
loss of customs revenue at a time of economic 
depression and fear of antagonising European dountries.53 
Finally, however, during June 1899 both parties 
narrowed their differences. In return for reduced 
Argentine rates on pine, lumber, furniture, canned 
goods and oils, the United States would lower her 
duties on sugar, wool and hides by 20%. Buchanan 
cabled Washington "The above ••••• is the only basis 
practicable or obtainable. I believe it fair and 
advantageous. Recommend our aoceptance 11 • 59 While 
directing the Minister to continue his efforts 
for greater concessions, Secretary of State Hay 
58Bucha.nan to Hay, Dec.27 1898. Di¥• Des. 
Vol.37, no.592. Buchanan to Hay, June 5,899. 
Dip. Des. Vol.38, no,706 
59Buchanan to Hay, June 17, 1899. Dip. Des. 
Vol. 38, telegram 
56. 
authorized him to conclude the convention. This was 
done on July 10th when Buchanan and Alcorta signed 
the first Argentine-North American commercial treaty 
since 1853. 60 
That the United States Congress failed to ratify 
the agreement was due solely to domestic considerations. 
Throughout the negotiations, Buchanan was constantly 
aware of .,the nsupersensi tiveness" existing among North 
,- .. 
.A..uerica.n wool producers to any tariff changes. 01 
Repeatedly they voiced their concern and obstructed 
Senate approval. On two occasions Buenos Aires granted 
the United States extensions asf time for exchange of 
ratifications. 62 However, after three years, the 
treaty had still not been acted upon. Argentina's 
response was one of distaste, but not of surprise. 63 
Issues other than commercial intruded upon 
United States - Argentine relations during the decade. 
On the 21st April 1898 war broke out between Washington 
and Madrid. Portefio newspapers denounced the conflict 
60Buchanan to Hay, July 10, 1899. Di;e. Des. 
Vol.38, no.719 
61 Buchanan to Hay, April 26, 1899. DiJ2. Des. 
Vol.38, no.679 
62Lord to Hay, March 24, 1900. Dip. Des. 
Vol.39, no.7 
631110Gann, T.F. Argentina the United States 
and the Inter-American s,siem 18~0 - 1914. 
(Cambridge, 1957), pg.17 
57. 
and took the lead in condemning Yankee imperialism. 
The United States Consul in Buenos Aires reported that 
the feeling against North Americans was very strong. 
Wrote he, "There are about 70,000 Spaniards in this 
city, who are everything but friendly to the 200 
.Americans residing here11 • 64 
Argentine animosity toward the United States, 
however, was soon dissipated by North American 
participation in the Puna de Atacama dispute. 
The 1881 Wire Treaty had not settled controversy over 
the Argentine-Chilean boundary. A heightening of 
tension between the two countries during 1898 led 
the Chilean Foreign Minister to once again ask for 
United States assistance. In recommending acceptance, 
Buchanan argued that Washington should become involved 
0 to secure the most friendly status possible in each 
(country)". Otherwise London would arbitrate and use 
the situation to further her interests and gain 
influence. 65 
Authorized by the State Department to partici~ 
pate, the North American Minister played a major role 
in the settlement of the dispute. In a series of 
four conferences held at the United States Legation, 
Buchanan acted as final arbiter on the Demarcation 
Commission. His services were widely appreciated. 
64r.1ayer to Day, March 11, 1898. Con. Des. 
Vol.23, letter 
65Buchanan to Day, Sept.22, 1898. Dip. Des. 
Vol.37, no.562 
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On both sides of the Andes, there was 11 very sincere 
gratification at thus seeing happily ended one of the 
most vexatious of the questions which have kept the 
people of the two Republics apart, and, at times, 
so near to a possible war 11 • 66 Promised President 
Roca in his annual message to Congress, the North 
.American diplomat's contribution would not be 
forgotten. 67 
Other events also contributed to better United 
states - Argentine relations. During 1896 Minister 
Buchanan and Foreign Minister Alcorta negotiated a 
Treaty of Extradition. It eased the procedure, whereby 
each government surrendered the other's criminals, 
hitherto a matter of some contention. 68 Two years 
later Buenos Aires resumed payments to and membership 
of the United States - sponsored Bureau of American 
Republics. In so doing, she ended a five year dispute 
with Washington. 69 
By the end of the decade trade between the two 
republics had returned to the level of that prior to 
the Baring Crisis and showed signs of improving still 
more. Argentine exports to the United States were 
66Buchanan to Hay, April 7, 1899. DiE• Des. 
Vol.39, no.661 
67Buchanan to Hay, May 2, 1899. DiE• Des. 
Vol.38, no.684 
68Buchanan to Olney, Oct,7, 1896. DiE• Des. 
Vol,33, no.259 
69Buchanan to Sherman, May 28, 1897. Dip. Des. 
Vol.34, no,352. Buchanan to Hay, Dec.19, 1898. Dip. 
Des. Vol.37, no.590 
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valued at $5,112,561 in 1899, $8,114,304 in 1900. 
United States shipmentsto Argentina were worth 
$9,563,510 in 1899, $11,558,237 in 1900. 70 Of 
greater significance the North American share of the 
Argentine import market had grown from 8.9% in 1895 
to 13.2% in 1900. 71 Wrote one English editor, 11 It 
is to North America, which now ranks as a close second 
in the list of foreign purveyors to Argentina, that 
English exporters must look to as a competing 
t 0 72 coun ry •••• 
United States capital in Argentina at the close 
of the nineties remained minimal - $3,000,000 on 
January 1st, 1899. 73 Her businessmen, however, now 
formed an integral part of the Argentine economy. 
After 1895 foreign investment in the River Plate had 
opened up new fields such as tramways, gas and electric 
power and specialized industrial:machinery. Within 
these new fields North American enterprise was playing 
an increasingly significant role. 
70statistical Abstract of the United States, 
1906. (Washington, 1907), pg.217 
71 Ferrer, James. "United States - Argentine 
Economic Relations 1900 - 1930. Ph.D. Thesis. 
(University of California, 1964). pg.18 
72Buchanan to Hay, May 6, 1899. Dip. Des. 
Vol.38, no.686 
73r.:'rcGann, T .F. Argentina, the United States 
and the Inter-American system 1880 - 1914 (Cambridge, 
1957) pg.228 
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During 1898 a Special Commissioner was appointed 
by the London Board of Trade to investigate British 
commerce with South America. In Buenos Aires he 
found 90% of all agricultural and electrical 
machinery came from the United States. Her motors 
and fittings were not only much cheaper, but more 
advanced than English machines, which had not kept 
pace with the latest designs and imp~ovements. Also 
of North American origin, Worthington noted, were the 
tramway lines and an increasing amount of the rolling 
stock on British and Argentine railways. 74 
Perhaps more important for future relations, 
however, was the growing use by United States manufact-
urers of sophisticated business methods. Many sent 
Spanish catalogues and free samples to Buenos Aires, 
while the practice of granting longer credit terms had 
become increasingly popular. Moreover, quite a few 
North American firms were now employing direct sales 
representatives bn the River Plate. Reported 
Worthington,"I have heard of considerable orders having 
gone to the United States ••••••• because British makers 
are unable to give early delivery, and the leading 
American makers have influential and active agents on 
the spot 11 • 75 
74Reports of Mr. T. Worthington, The Special 
Commissioner _.[l..ppointed by the Board of Trade to Inquire 
into and Report upon the Conditions and Prospects of 
British Trade in Certain South American Countries. 
Brit. Parl. Papers, Third Report. The Argentine 
Republic 1898. pg.18-20 
75ibid, pg.18 
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United States representatives at Buenos Aires 
were well aware that the interest shown by their 
countrymen in Argentina had grown. Minister BuchanaJ?. 
wrote of his inability to answer the increasing number 
of North American inquiries about the Republic, while 
Consul Mayer complained that he was having to work til 
12 o'clock at night to fulfil his duties. 76 The 
Buenos Aires Herald observed in 1899, "There is little 
doubt that this is the busiest consulate in the city; a 
fact which speaks well for the growth of commercial 
relations between North America and Argentina11 • 77 
Despite the Baring Crisis and her failure to 
secure a commercial treaty, the United States finished 
the decade with a finn foothold in the Argentine market. 
Not only had trade between the two countries reached 
its highest level, but ~North .America had become 
Great Britain's closest competitor for Argentina's 
import trade. This was reflected by the growing 
bitterness of Anglo-American trade rivalry on the 
River Plate. By 1900, however, there was still as yet 
little United States capital invested in that region. 
It was after the turn of the century that attempts to 
remedy this were made. 
76Buchanan to Gresham, 0ct~29, 1894. Dip. Des. 
Vol.31, no.68. Mayer to Day, Jan.19, 1898. Con. Des. 
Vol.23, no.2 




RESEARCHING THE JYIARKET, 1 900 - 1906 
After the turn of the century, Argentina 
rapidly developed into one of the world's leading 
producers of foodstuffs. In five years the area under 
cultivation almost doubled and were extended 
to every corner of the pampas. Argentine exports of 
frozen meat to Great Britain became increasingly 
common, while grain shipments grew at a phenomenal rate. 
Du.ring 1904, for the first time in her history, the 
Republic produced more than two million tons of 
wheat, as well as record quantities of linseed and 
corn. 1 
These changes brought Buenos Aires into a 
closer relationship with Washington. By 1900 the 
United States had matured to the point where her 
industries needed Argentine raw materials and her 
population could absorb some of that country's vast 
food surpluses. Moreover,North American industrial 
production had grown beyond the capacity of domestic 
consumption. 11 0ur manufacturers", one United States 
1McGann, T.F. Argentina, the United States and 
the Inter-American System 1880 - 1914. (Cambridge, 
195'/), pg.263 
envoy observed, "are every day looking for new and 
better markets abroad, our home markets becoming 
every year more and more sated with our products; in 
other words, we have become an exporting country11 • 2 
At a time when her national wealth and purchasing 
power were increasing, Argentina offered a logical 
and lucrative outlet. 
From the United states Legation at Buenos Aires, 
reports continued to come of potentially rich invest-
ments for North American enterprise. There is, 
Minister Barrett believed, "no other country in the 
world that has before it, ••• greater undeveloped 
opportunities of agriculture, commerce and population, 
together with so much present material progress 11 • 3 
Railroad construction, government works, public 
utility projects all wanted Yankee goods and capital. 
Reported Barrett's successor, 11 The articles are 
needed, there is money to pay for them, and the people 
are well disposed toward American products 11 • 4 
Additional forces were stimulating Argentine 
and United States interest in each other. At the turn 
2Beaupre to Hay, Oct.6, 1904. DiE• Des. 
Yol.43, unnumbered. 
3Barrett to Hay, Feb.8, 1904. Di:E• Des. 
Yol.42, no.38 
4Beaupre to Hay, Aug.26, 1904. DiJ2. Des. 
Vol.43, no.24 
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of the century, both were aware of their increasing 
competition for European and South .American markets. 
By 1900 Argentina's wheat exports to Brazil had 
completely displaced those··from North .America, while 
five years later her meat exports to Great Britain 
exceeded United States shipmentsfor the first time. 5 
To Washington, therefore, the River Plate was becoming 
increasingly important as both a trade rival and 
potential market. 
During the early nineteen hundreds, however, 
Great Britain remained economically dominant through-
out South America. By 1900 her Argentine investments 
amounted to £189,040,000, representing 80¾ of all 
foreign capital in that country. The same year 
commerce between London and Buenos Aires reached 
£21,223,000, 38% of the Republic's total foreign trade. 6 
Noted one United states diplomat in 1902, Argentina 
was often referred to as a commercial annex of the 
United Kingdom. 7 
Before challenging British hegemony and tapping 
Argentine resources more fully, North .American business-
men needed accurate and reliable commercial information. 
5Lord to Hay, Jan.16, 1901. Dip. Des. Vol.40, 
no.91 
6 Ferns, H.S. 
Nineteenth Century. 
7Lord to Hay, 
no.186 
Britain and Argentina in the 
(Oxford, 1960) pg.493 
May 10, 1902. Dip. Des. Vol.40, 
In concentrating on the home market or those within 
easy reach, they had neglected and were ignorant of 
opportunities in South America. 8 European 
agricultural and commercial experts meanwhile had 
65. 
been making extensive studies and acquiring knowledge 
about that region. Unless the United States did like-
wise, Minister Barrett warned from Buenos Aires "the 
advantage gained by ••••••• European competitors will be 
so great that their lead cannot be overcome". 9 
Between 1900 and 1906, therefore, diverse 
private and public agencies in North America began 
to study more systematically and extensively Argentine 
tastes and requirements. The International Bureau 
of American Republics was particularly active in this 
respect. Now that Buenos Aires had reaffirmed member-
ship of that body, the Bureau worked hard to promote 
the River Plate as a potential overseas market. To 
this end a handbook was published which contained 
detailed information about opportunities there. 10 
8Emery, F. "Causes of our Failure to Develop 
South American Trade 11 , The .Annals of the .American 
Academy of Political and Social Science. Vol.22 
(1903), pg.153-156 




Various government departments sent represent-
atives to Argentina for research purposes. During 
1903 the United States Legation at Buenos Aires 
reported the arrival of an official from the Department 
of Agriculture, while two years later Professor 
Hutchinson, a commercial agent, studied that city's 
port facilities. 11 In 1904 an expert from the Fisheries 
Burea~ was employed by the Argentine g-overnmen t to 
investigate the Republic's fresh water lakes. 12 
"Their reports•.•, Minister Beaupre observed, 11 are every-
where sought abroad and their statements accepted with 
a flattering readiness and eagerness 11 • 13 
The State Department also acted to improve 
commercial intelligence from the region. During 1904 
the status of the United States Consulate was raised 
to that of Consulate-General. Instead of returning 
reports just on his own district, the consular 
representative there now gave market information 
covering the entire country. 14 Its publication in 
11 .Ames to Hay, May 12, 1903. Dip. Des. 
Vol.41, no.258. Beaupre to Root. Dec.18, 1905. 
pip. D§S..!, Vol.46, no.276. 
12Barrett to Hay, Jan. 1 3, 1904. Dip. Des,. 
Vol.42, no.23 
13Beaupre to Hay, Oct.6, 1904. Dip. Des. 
Vol.43, unnumbered. 
14rt should be noted, however, that prior to 
his death in 1897 Consul Baker attempted to report 
on all of Argentina - a duty for which he was unpaid. 
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government journals was of great benefit to North 
.American manufacturers. 
In November 1905 United States citizens 
at Buenos Aires formed 11 The North American Society of 
the River Plate 11 • Its purpose was to "encourage and 
maintain friendly relations with the country of (their) 
residence, and assist in promoting closer commercial 
union between North America and the countries of the 
River Plate ••• ". 15 To achieve this the society offered 
detailed information and advice for United States firms 
seeking markets in the Republic, while regular 
meetings were held to educate visiting businessmen in 
the diversity of porteno tastes and customs. 
This growing North American knowledge of 
Argentina was accompanied by moderately harmonious 
diplomatic relations. In 1901 a dispute flared up 
over Britain's refusal to allow the importation of 
Argentine livestock because of an outbreak of foot-and-
mouth disease. Buenos Aires retaliated by closing her 
ports to English cattle and any country which did not 
do the same, When Washington refused to act, the 
Argentine government imposed quarantine restrictions 
against United States bloodstock. 16 However these 
15Beaupre to Root, Dec.16, 1905. Dip. Des. 
Vol.46, no.275 
16Lord to Hay, June 28, 1901. Dip. Des. 
Vol.40, no.121 
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were removed a year later and trade between the two 
countries returned to normai, 17 
During the early years of the Twentieth Century 
both North America and Argentina defined their 
respective attitudes to hemispheric affairs. In 
December 1902 Great Britain, Germany and Italy 
established a blockade of Venezuela's ports to force 
her government to meet its debts. The Argentine Foreign 
Minister responded by arguing that "public debt gives 
no place for armed intervention, and less still to the 
material occupation of the soil of American nations 
by a European powel:'1. 18 His warm reception by the 
United States press was greatly appreciated in Buenos 
t 
Aires. The American Charge reported that Drago was 
"elated" and the attitude of the public "friendlier" 
to the Yankees. 19 
On December 6th 1904 President Roosevelt 
expounded his "Oorollary" - the idea that the United 
States might be obliged to act as a policeman in the 
more chaotic countries of Latin America. The difference 
between it and the Drago Doctrine which would determine 
17Lord to Hay, Feb.20, 1902. Dip. Des. Vol.40, 
no.17 
18Quoted in Connell - Smith, G. The United 
States and Latin America • .An Historical Anal sis of 
Inter... erican New or<, pg.1 
19Ames to Hay, May 5, 1903. Dip. Des. 
Vol.41, no.255 
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North .American-Argentine relations for the next three 
decades was, however, as yet not apparent. Thus the 
porteno press remained passive over Washington's 
intervention in Panama the year before and urged the 
government to stay uninvolved. 20 In 1905 Foreign 
Minister Larreta declared the Monroe Doctrine to be 
a doctrine of friendship and the United States an 
example of peace and progress. 21 Not until the 
conclusion of the First World War would his country 
fear the gran garrote. 
The English community at Buenos Aires viewed 
with concern the continuing warmth between the two 
Republics. They maintained their previous efforts 
to undermine it. During 1901 the Buenos Aires Herald 
ridiculed the work of the second Pan-American 
conference as worthless and impractical, 22 while the 
following year Washington was attacked for failing to 
ratify the commercial convention. Argued one 
editorial 11 ••• it will be a long time before the Argentine 
Government will enter into negotiations for another 
treaty of reciprocity with the United States ••• 1123 
20Barrett to Hay, Deo.25, 1903. DiB• Des. 
Vol.42, no.14. Barrett to Hay, Dec.29, 19 3. 
Dip. Des. Vol.42, no.17 
21 Beaupre to Root, Oct.24, 1905. DiE• Des. 
Vol.46, no.244 
22Mayer to Hill, May 28, 1902. Oon. Des. 
Vol.24, no.127 
23Lord to Hay, May 3, 1902. DiE• Des. Vol.40, 
no.182 
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Aspersions were again raised about the true 
nature of the Monroe Doctrine. The English newspapers 
portrayed it to the porteiios as"a snare to entrap them 
and at an opportune time, swoop down upon their country 
and take charge of the Government". 24 When the 
Roosevelt Corollary was expounded in 1904, both the 
Buenos Aires Herald and the Buenos Aires Standard led 
the attack against it. The Monroe Doctrine, the 
former deolared, was aggressive, constituting "a 
standing defiance, a gl•ove thrown down, which any 
European Power may be tempted to take up 11 • 25 
This Anglo-.American disharmony was also carried 
over to the commercial arena. In 1904 a representative 
of several large North .American car-building companies 
secured an order to build $(US)700,000 worth of 
rolling stock for the North Argentine Railway. It 
was won in competition against fourteen other firms, 
amongst whom were prominent English concerns. 26 When 
the United States wagons began to arrive, the Buenos 
Aires Herald emphasized their unusual dimensions and 
cast doubts as to their suitability. 27 
24cole to Root, April 26, 1906. Con. Des. 
Vol.24, private letter. 
25Beaupre to Hay, Dec.12, 1904. DiE• Des. 
Vol.44, no.97 
26Beaupre to Hay, Aug.26, 1904. DiE• Des. 
Vol.43, no.24 
27Beaupre to Hay, April 5, 1905. Di;e. Des. 
Vol.45, no.142 
Likewise, during the same year, fourteen 
pedigree heifers were imported in an attempt to 
open up the Argentine Republic to North American 
cattle. English importers who had long enjoyed 
a monopoly of the market were not disposed to sit 
71. 
by and lose a portion of their business to North 
America. The United States Minister reported they 
were open in their criticism of the livestock and did 
everything in their power to prejudice the sale. As 
a result Argentine breeders became reluctant to 
purchase and the animals fetched low prices. 28 
To offset such harassment and gain more trade, 
North .American representatives at Buenos Aires 
repeated their call for greater assistance. Minister 
Barrett sdught to promote agricultural scholarships 
for young Argentines to study in the United States. 
There they could not only be introduced to North 
American livestock, but be trained in the use of 
that country's machinery. The result, Barrett argued, 
would be "to develop in Argentina closer ties of 
friendship for us "North Americans", •••• and counter-
balance to some extent the European influence which is 
now predominant 11 • 29 
28Beaupre to Hay, Sept.20, 1904. Di;e. Des. 
Vol.43, no.45 
29Barrett to Hay, Jan.28, 1904. DiJ2• Des. 
Vol.42, no.32 
72. 
His successor to the post, Beaupre, wanted 
United States firms to establish branch offices or 
agencies in the Republic. These should be under the 
direct charge of competent men sent out from North 
America who could speak Spanish and were suited to 
deal with Argentines. Their presence would secure a 
greater share of the market from Euxopean competition 
and allow for the quick replacement of missing or 
hT'okt=m parts 9 3° Contended the Minister, "nothing but 
personal representation will wrest the business out of 
the hands of other peoples and supplant their inferior 
or more expensive article by the cheaper or better 
American 11 • 31 
Also deserving attention, Beaupre wrote, was 
the status of the United States Legation at Buenos 
Aires. Few European countries were represented in 
the Argentine capital by ambassadors. During 1904 
Washington and Rio de Janeiro elevated their ministries 
in each other's country to the rank of embassies. To 
' both increase her prestige vis-a-vis Europe and 
placate Argentine resentment, Beaupre suggested that 
North America's representation in Argentina be likewise 
raised. 32 
30Beaupre to Hay, March 16, 1905. DiJ2. Des. 
Vol.45, no.135 
31 Beaupre to Hay, Aug.26, 1904. DiJ2. Des. 
Vol.43, no.24 
32Beaupre to Acting Secretary of State, July 11 , 
1905. Di;e. Des. Vol.45, no.175 
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From 1900 to 1906, the United States found the 
Southern Republic a steady market for her manufactured 
products. During 1904 North .American sales to that 
country made their first sizeable increase to 
$16,902,000. Argentine exports to the United States 
failed to grow as rapidly. Although they more than 
doubled over a six-year period, the flow of trade 
between the two countries remained firmly in the latter's 
favour. In 1904 the trade balance against Argentina 
stood at $7,000,000. Two years later this had grown 
to more than $14,000,ooo. 33 
Between 1904 and 1906 combined United States-
Argentine trade figures reached new heights. During 
those two years they increased from $26,737,178 to 
$ 34 51,052,422. Argentina was now Washington's biggest 
customer in South .America. 35 Reported Minister Beaupre 
11 ••• there is an opening at Buenos Aires for nearly 
every article manufactured in the United States 11 • 36 
33statistical Abstract of the United States, 
1906. (Washington, 1907), pg.217 
34ibid. 
35rn 1904 the United States sold imports to 
Brazil amounting to fourteen million dollars and 
bought Brazilian exports totaling sixty-five million 
dollars. Burns, E.B. The Unwritten Alliancef Rio-
Branco and Brazilian-American Relations. (Co umbia 
University Press, 1966) 
36Beaupre to Hay, Aug.26, 1904. Dip. Des. 
Vol.43, no.24 
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Chief among North American imports into 
Argentina were iron and steel products. By 1906 they 
had become worth an estimated ~~8, 395 ,ooo. Next came 
wood and wood manufacture:s:_ with a value of $6,091,000. 
Agricultural implement sales continued their steady 
climb, while electrical machinery regained much of the 
ground it had earlier lost to German competition. 37 
The most spectacular growth, however, occurred 
in the supply of railroad materials. Between 1904 
and 1906 United States sales of steel rails jumped 
from $139,000 to $2,841,000, thereby breaking Britain's 
monopoly over the market. 38 Not only did Argentine 
state railways now make major purchases in North 
.Ai~erica, but British railroads also were on occasions 
turning to United States manufacturers. During 1905 
the North American Legation at Bu:enos Aires1 reported 
that the director of the Entre Rios Railway had become 
an ardent advocate of Yankee methods of railway manage-
ment and rolling stock and had introduced both to his 
company. 39 
One reason for the big increase in United States-
Argentine commerce was the introduction of North 
American branch offices in Argentina. During 1903 
37Ferrer, J. "United States-Argentine Economic 
Relations, 1900-1930". Ph.D. Thesis. (University of 
California, 1964) pg.51 
38ibid 
39Beaupre to Hay, March 11, 1905. Dip. Des. 
Vol.45, no.130 
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the United Shoe Machinery Company opened an office 
at Buenos Aires, while three years later the Singer 
Sewing Machine Company opened the second United States 
branch in that city. Both firms were so successful 
there that they soon began some minor assembling work. 
By founding their own selling agencies and 
avoiding the established commercial houses, North 
American exporters were destroying an important 
European advantage. Moreover,they were now in a 
better position to gauge local tastes and demand. 
' In the year the United Shoe Company arrived• Charge 
Ames reported that American shoes had secured 40% of 
the market and that a slight alteration of design 
had dona much to add to their acceptability. 40 
Both the above branches were primarily 
merchandising offices, not manufacturing plants. During 
1906 a United States firm, the Argentine Wool and Sheep-
skin Company began operations at Avellaneda. The 
company processed 80,000 to 90,000 sheepskins a month 
for shipment to North America. Prior to the establish-
ment of this branch, the parent firm had obtained 
Argentine sheepskins from French and English processors •41 
40Ames to Hay, Dec.?, 1903. Dip. Des. Vol.42, 
no.312 
41 Eddy to Root, Nov.24, 1908. 
Archives De artment of State 
er 
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Recognition of Argentina's growing importance 
to the United States led Secretary of State Root to 
visit Buenos Aires in 1906. Bitter reference had been 
made in the porte:no papers to the choice of Rio de 
Janeiro as the site for the Third Pan American 
Conference and the Secretary's subsequent stop at 
that city. 42 Despite these, however, Root received 
a warm and enthusiastic welcome when he came to the 
Argentine capital. His public statements, especially 
those against the forcible collection of public debts, 
effectively subdued press criticism. To many it 
seemed the Monroe Doctrine and the Drago Doctrine had 
been harmonized.43 
During 1906 the United States Legation in Buenos 
Aires reported Argentina had never been more friendly 
towards the "Colossus of the North". Moreover, that she 
was looking to develop greater political and economic 
ties. 44 When bids opened for the corutruction of three 
iron bridges in Mendoza, the Director General there was 
especially instructed to present the offer to United 
States financiers. 45 The Argentine government clearly 
42Beaupre to Root, Dec.4, 1905. Dip. Des. 
Vol.46, nq.263 
43The Economist 2 Sept.29, 1906, pg.1578 
44Beaupre to Root, 
Vol.46, no.301 
Jan.22, 1906. Dip. Des. 
45Beaupre to Root, Jan.13, 1906. Dip. Des. 
Vol.46, no.298 
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wanted North American products and capital. The next 
eight years would see Washington's attempt to fulfil 
that order. 
By the turn of the century the United States 
had become aware of Argentina"s increasing importance 
as both a trade rival and potential market. The 
necessity for reliable and accurate market information 
was therefore acute. To meet this, North American 
firms established branch offices, government departments 
dispatched commercial experts, United States manufact-
urers formed trade organisations. As a consequence 
between 1900 and 1906 the groundwork for future capital 
involvement was laid and the apparatus erected for 
closer commercial ties. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ARGENTINE MEAT INDUSTRY. 
During the last decades of the nineteenth 
century North Americans had gained a monopoly in the 
supply of certain goods to Argentina. Failing to 
invest capitAl, they had penetrated few of that 
country's businesses or industries. Beginning in 
1907, however, United States finns drove to secure 
a more permanent foothold in the Republic. This 
took the form of concentrating investment in certain 
key areas of the Argentine economy. There North 
American enterprise and finance attempted to over-
come British dominance and hostility. 
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The movement of United States capital into 
Argentina began with the refrigerated meat industry. 
By the turn of the century that industry.had been 
established along the Rio Plata on a commercial basis. 
Techniques of preparing, shipping and marketing 
refrigerated beef had been perfected, pennitting 
regular export to the British market. During 1907 
Chicago meat companies soughtto establish a 
presence in the region. 
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That the North American packer should look 
to the River Plate was not surprising. Within the 
United States the amount of beef available for export 
was declining as the domestic market absorbed an 
increasing proportion of available cattle. In 1905 
Argentine meat shipments to Great Britain exceeded 
those by North America for the first time. 1 Either 
new sources of supply had to be found or the lucrative 
English market abandoned. 
It was also evident that the United States would 
soon herself become an importer of beef. Argentine 
firms had been making improvements in the quality 
of meat shipments and would shortly be better able 
to compete with the North .American product. To the 
Chicago packing firms, therefore, greater involvement 
on the River Plate was not only highly attractive, but 
vitally necessary. Moreover,one United States diplomat 
in Buenos Aires observed, there was the added poss-
ibility that such a step "might eventually lead to a 
combination of American and Argentine meat interests 
by which the meat markets of the world could be 
controlled". 2 
2 Jones to Hay, Aug.24, 1899. Dip. Des. 
Vol.38, no.736 
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During 1899 a representative of Swift & co. 
had arrived at Buenos Aires to study market conditions 
and opportunities. 3 Eight years later that firm 
' bought out La Plata. the largest frigorifico in 
Argentina. Attempts were made immediately to promote 
the breeding of top quality animals and expand output, 
By·[1908 Swift had become the second largest shipper of 
Argentine beef, handling 27,6% of the chilled product 
and 16.4% of the frozen. 4 
Other North American packers also sought bases 
for operations in this new area. During 1908 
Schwartzchild & Sulzberger held negotiations with the 
I 
Frigorifico Argentine, but purchase terms could not be 
agreed on and the deal fell through. Late in the 
same year the National Packing Co., a combination of 
Swift, Morris and Armour~ purchased the La Blanca 
Storage Co. at Avellaneda. Chicago-based packing-
houses now controlled about half the chilled-beef 
and a third of the frozen-beef exports. 5 
3Jones to Hay, Nov.23, 1899. Dip. Des. 
Vol.38, no.161 
4Hanson, Argentine Meat, pg,149 
5smith, P.H., Politics and Beef in Ar~entina. 
P~tterns of Conflict and change (New York,olumbia 
University Press, 1969), pg.58 
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To the British, the increasing North Americar~ 
presence was of major concern. For the precedilJi~, 
' two decades, English frigorificos had enjoyed a 
near-monopoly over the meat freezing business in 
Argentina. Along with locally-owned companies, 
they had met informally to regulate prices and reduce 
competition amongst themselves. The arrival of the 
United States firms, whose reputation for cooperative 
action and ruthless tactics was well established, 
raised the spectre of increased competition and 
threatened British control of the industry. 
As a result British packers sought to halt the 
North American advance. During 1907 there was growing 
concern within the United Kingdom at the threat of a 
worldwide meat shortage. Company representatives 
proposed that the Board of Trade support an amalgamation 
of British packinghouses that would assure Great 
Britain of its meat supply and yield an annual interest 
to the Crown. However, the project was considered 
impossible and the government would not even undertake 
to convey a friendly intimation to Buenos Aires. 6 
In Argentina, the English language newspapers 
denounced Yankee involvement in the meat freezing 
business. Estancieros were warned that the North 
American firms would join forces to gain a monopoly 
and depress prices. To prevent this, they were urged 
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to establish their own cooperative plants. 7 Meanwhile, 
dluring June 1909, British interests in the Argentine 
Congress supported a bill which prohibited any 
"trusts or joint action" in the meatpacking business. 8 
Most Argentine ranchers, however, were reluctant 
to follow this course. The Chicago companies desire 
for better quality animals meant cattle prices were 
steadily rising. Moreover, their arrival was regarded 
as a means of releasing estanciepos from the clutches 
of British firms. The national cabinet, therefore, 
refused to sponsor any anti-trust measures. Instead 
the Argentines placed the responsibility for legislative 
action with Britain, whose ban against Argentine live-
stock was still bitterly resented. 9 
As meat prices rose and dependence on Argentine 
beef grew, London became more deeply concerned with 
developments on the Plate. In 1909 a Departmental 
Committee was appointed to investigate the level of 
United States control over .Britain's meat supply .• 
7For example, the Review of the River Plate, 
Oct.24, 1908. Quoted in Hanson, Argentine Meat, pg.148 
8The bill was sponsored by Carlos and Manuel 
Carles. Though representing the city of Buenos Aires, 
the Caries brothers came from a prominent cattle-
owning family and spoke on behalf of British investors. 
9The Economist, 28 July, 1906, pg.1253 
The Committee's report found that while the main 
North American meat companies acted in concert, they 
were at present not sufficiently powerful to dictate 
prices. It warned, however, that should the Chicago 
packers make further inroads into Argentina, the 
entire beef trade could come under their contro1. 10 
During 1909 the North Americans began to 
expand their operations. Over the next two years 
they doubled their exports of frozen and chilled 
beef. Initially prices were unaffected owing to the 
collapse of the United States surplus. However, the 
British market could not expand indefinitely and late 
in 1910 the trade became unprofitable. The North 
.American shipments nevertheless continued and during 
1911 exports were over 30% greater than those during 
the previous year. 11 
In competing with the British and Argentine 
I 
frigorificos, the United States firms enjoyed several 
advantages. Their plants made more efficient use of 
by-products and were better situated at tidewater 
locations. 12 Most importantly, they possessed greater 
10The Economist, 15 May, 1909, pg.1030 
11 Hanson, Argentine Meat', pg.158-159 
12while port loading and transshipments from 
lighters hindered other plants, La Plata was rarely 
delayed by low water and steamers could load and 
head for England swiftly. La Blanca also shipped 
efficiently. 
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financial resources, enabling them both to pay more 
for cattle and endure greater losses than the smaller 
British and. Argentine firms. As a result, by 
deliberately increasing sales and overloading the 
market, the North Americans sought to drive their 
competitors from the industry. 
In November 1911 the meat companies managed to 
reach an agreement. They established a "pool" where 
each company was alloted every six weeks a percentage 
of total exports. The North American share comprised 
initially 41%, the British 40% and the Argentine 19%. 
In three years the United States firms had seized leader-
ship of the industry. They now controlled two thirds 
of the chilled beef exports, one-fifth of the frozen 
and one-third of the mutton, 13 
The North American expansion went on. During 
1910 Swift & Co. had opened another plant at Rio 
Gallegos. This was followed a year later by the pur-
chase of Oibil Saladero in Uruguay and the New 
Patagonian Meat & Cold Storage co. in Patagonia. 
The 11 18 de Julio" Saladero at Montevideo also passed 
into Yankee hands, 14 while Armour & Co. began to up-
grade their La Blanca plant. Observed the United 
13Ferrer, J., "United States - Argentine Economic 
Relations, 1900 - 1930 11 • Ph.D. Thesis. (University 
of California, 1964), pg,45-46 
I 
14This was later renamed the "Frigorifico 
Montevideo". 
States Consul General "the export trade of Argentina 
in preserved meats of all kinds is assuming larger 
and larger porportions; and affords good openings 
for investment of American capital on a large scale11 • 15 
To meet this competition, the British and 
Argentine firms were also active in improving their 
operations. During 1910 Smithfield and Argentine co. 
issued new shares to extend its works. A year later 
' Sansinena outbid Swift & Co. and purchased Frigorifica 
Uruguaya. Las Palmas revised its shipping contract 
' to enable quicker delivery to England, while Frigorifico 
Argentina opened its own retailing outlet there. Under 
pressure from efficient competitors, these firms 
were seeking to hold their share of the market. 
Early in 1913 the North Americans moved again 
to establish dominance in the Argentine meat industry. 
The United States Congress had begun to revise tariff 
schedules. Import duties on fresh meat would soon 
be abolished, thus opening up the North .American 
market to foreign beef. To forestall potential 
disruption at home, the Chicago packers sough.tgreater 
control over the River Plate trade. 
During January Swift & Co. requested that either 
its Montevideo plant be left outside pool restrictions 
or that an addition to La Plata•s portion of the market 
15Bartleman to Assistant Sec. of State, 
Feb.24, 1910. Num. File. 22079/1, no.230 
be made. A month later La Blanca followed suit and 
asked for a 50% increase in its share. To preserve 
' peace, the other frigorificos offered the North 
.Americans a smaller rise. However, this was not 
accepted and both La Plata and La Blanca began to 
expand output. 16 
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British packers viewed the prospect of another 
price war with alann. They urged the Argentine govern-
ment to interrene a..Yld warnAd that if the pool was 
abandoned the British market would be swamped with 
meat. In London, company spokesmen persuaded an 
Argentine representative that the resulting high 
price of livestock on the River Plate would lead 
to excessive slaughtering and therefore irreparably 
harm the industry as a whole. Buenos Aires, however, 
would not act unless there was proof of an intention 
to form a monopoly. 17 
' On April 5 1913 the pool ended and the frigori-
ficos were free from restrictions on exports. Working 
together, the two North American companies raised 
their shipments to the quantity previously exported 
by the entire .. industry. British and Argentire firms 
16The Economist, 19 July, 1913, pg.119 
17The Economist, 12 July, 1913, pg.70 
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responded by also expanding output. As a result the 
British market was swamped with ·chilled beef, and 
prices fell dramatically at Smithfield. 18 
Again the British tried to stimulate political 
action. Company representatives and the pro-English 
press argued the only purpose of the North American 
action was to form a monopoly and warned that without 
governmental .intervention their plants would be 
obliged to close. Min~ster Tower infonned London 
that the manager of Nelsons was collaborating with 
other non-United States firms to arouse feeling 
against a trust in meat. For this purpose Argentine 
deputies were "being sedulously provided with 
material for future speeohes •••• in Oongress 11 • 19 
In Britain the Foreign Office viewed the price 
war with growing concern. While the meat packing 
rivalry provided beef cheaply for consumers, British 
stockmen were suffering. Consequently Buenos Aires 
was requested to limit the exports of each packing-
house. Commented Tower, the British government "would 
watch with sympathetic concern any action which might 
be taken for the purpose of preventing the establishment 
of a monopoly in the meat export trade". 20 
20Tower to Grey, June 11, 1913. P.H.01.F.O. 
368/785. 
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For their part the Chicago meat companies 
denied any connection between them. They asserted 
that heavy shipments of meat were matle only in 
fulfillment of long-standing contracts and that the 
high price of cattle in Argentina was due to scarcity 
caused by drought. MoreoveP, the North Americans 
claimed, they could still make a profit at current 
meat prices because their system of working was 
1=mp,:n"ior to that of the other firms. To prove this, 
they offered to put their books at the disposal of 
Argentine officials. 21 
Impressed by the North American testimony, the 
Argentine government again refused to take any action. 
At a special conference the Minister of Agriculture 
and other leading cattlemen decided that no measures 
should be taken against the packers unless they 
threatened the interests of Argentine ranchers. 
Draft bills to tax excessive exports and thus limit 
the output of each packinghouse were rejected. Instead 
Foreign Minister Mujica informed Tower the best way to 
combat any meat trust would be to reopen British 
ports to Argentine livestock. 22 
The introduction of the Underwood tariff in 
1913 enabled Argentine meat to successfully enter the 
21 The Economist, 12 July, 1913, pg.70 
22The Economist, 19 July, 1913, pg.119 
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United states market. That year 6,621 tons were 
re-exported from England to North America. Twelve 
months later this had risen to 65,390 tons or slightly 
less than one sixth of total Argentine exports. 23 
For the first time shipments of chilled beef went 
directlyfromBuenos Aires to New York. Now more than 
ever the North .Americans felt impelled to advance 
their control of the Argentine industry. 
Meat from La Plata and La Blanca continued to 
swamp the British market. As a result topgrade 
Argentine beef could be purchased in London at a 
lower price than inferior meat was bringing in Buenos 
Aires. 24 The British and Argentine companies tried 
to resist this pressure by also maintaining increased 
exports. However, by the end of 1913 the trade was so 
unprofitable that their plants were contracting 
shipping space for other cargoes. 
During September 1913 the intense competition 
' began to bring results when Frigorifico Argentine 
closed down. It was leased by a North .American firm 
Sulzberger & Sons, who considered a source of supply 
in Argentina essential to holding its position in the 
United States. Four months later the River Plate and 
Las Palmas firms merged into the British & Argentine 
Meat Co. In an effort to effect economies and withstand 
competition, the new firm closed the Las Palmas plant 
23Hanson, Argentine Meat, pg.182 
~fThe Economist, 12 July, 1913, pg.70 
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and concentrated production at Campana. 25 
Eventually, however, Anglo-Argentine resistance 
broke and early 1914 negotiations for a new pool 
began. By June the meat companies succeeded in 
reaching an agreement. Chicago - based plants now 
controlled 59% of the market, compared to 29% for 
the British and 12% for the Argentines. 26 Once 
more the North Americans had retained their gains 
of the 
The expansion of North American capital into 
Argentina began in earnest with the refrigerated 
meat trade. Over a seven year period, United states 
firms secured dominance in one of Argentina's 
leading industries. Through concerted action and 
competitive tactics, they overcame the intense 
' opposition of British and Argentine frigorificos. 
In so doing the North .American presence in the 
Argentine economy became something real and permanent. 
25The Economist, 4'~April, 1914, pg.819 
~~Smith, Politics and Beef, pg.68 
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CHAPTER V 
BATTLESHIP DIPLOMACY, 1909 - 1910 
The North .American desire to overcome British 
economic dominance in prewar Argentina was not 
confined to the meat industry. During 1909 Taft 
assu.TD.ed the Presidency, marking a radical change in 
United states foreign relations with Latin .America. 
Pursuing a vigorous policy of "dollar diplomacy", 
Washington employed both financial and diplomatic 
pressure to open new markets in the regionfor her 
manufacturers. The expru1sion of naval armaments 
among_ South .American nations .offered one potentially 
lucrative outlet,. 
Argentina began considering a major increase 
of her navy during July 1906 in response to Brazil's 
purchase of three modern battleships. A year later 
controversy over the jurisdiction of the waters of 
the River Plate heightened tension between the two 
countries. Argentine newspapers berated the government 
for its inaction in the face of growing Brazilian 
1 m.enace. As a result in August 1 908 the Chamber of 
Deputies voted $55,000,000 for naval annament. 2 
1wilson to Root, Sept.9, 1907. Num. File 
Case ,1070/14, no.16 
2Eddy to Root, Nov.25, 1908. Nurn. File 
1070/26, no.46 
North American arms manu.:1ad:iurers were not 
caught unprepared. Three months before the bill 
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became law, an agent of the Bethleh~m Steel Corporation 
had approached the United States Legation at Buenos 
Aires for official assistance.' When the Argentine 
government announced a special naval commission in 
London would receive aJ.l bids, the President of 
Bethlehem himself, travelled to the British capital. 
He was followed by representatives of four other North 
.American companies. 4 
Initially though the United States finns 
seemed to have little possibility of winning the 
contracts. Previously they had not competed to any 
great extent in the international armament business 
with the result that their weaponry was largely 
unknown within South America. In contrast Krupp, 
Amstrong, Vickers, Ansaldo and Schneider - Creusot 
had equipped all the Southern Republics, while many 
Argentine officers had trained in Europe. 5 
Moreover, the Roosevelt administration refused 
to actively support the North American companies. 
3Eddy to Root, Oct.22, 1908. Num.File 1070/23, 
no.34 
4They were Fore River Ship Building Company, 
New York Ship Building Company, Newport News Ship-
building and Dry Dock Company and the Cramps Ship 
Building Company, of Philadelphia. 
5Eddy to Root, Dec.31, 1908. Num. File 
1070/40, no.62 
Beyond authorizing Mr. Eddy in Buenos Aires and 
.Ambassador Reid in London to secure for them 
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"equality of treatment" with other bidders, the State 
Department left the initiative largely to the 
manufacturers and shipbuilders themselves. 6 European 
governments on the other hand had frequently exerted 
strong diplomatic pressure on behalf of their nationals. 
To this end they could remind the Argentine government 
of their extensive financial interests within the 
country. 11 So great were these different advantages 
enjoyed by Europeans •••• ", one' United states 
government official observed, "that the mere making 
of bids by .American firms caused great surprise 11 • 7 
The advent of Taft and Knox, however, signified 
a radical change in North American policy. The State 
Department launched at once upon a vigorous campaign, 
to secure the naval business for United States shipyards. 
The recently-created Division of Latin American Affairs 
provided assistance for those firms making bids, while 
a new envoy, Oharles H. Sherrill, was sent to Buenos 
Aires with instructions to actively promote the North 
American cause. At Knox's request United States bankers 
subscribed a $10 million loan that made possible the 
immediate expansion of the Argentine navY, 8 
6Bacon to Reid, Feb.11, 1909. Num. File. 
1070/39, no.907 
7Memorandum by the Chief of Latin American 
Affairs, Jan.22, 1910, Num. File 1070/175 
8Wilson to Knox, March 7, 1909. Num.. File 
Memorandum 
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As a further inducement to the placing of 
contracts with North American shipyards, United States 
naval secrets were put at the disposal of the 
Argentine government. During April Buenos Aires 
was furnished with the specifications of the 
latest North .American dreadnought with a request that 
the matter be kept confidential. Two months later the 
Bethlehem Steel Corporation obtained permission to use 
confidential ordnance specifications if it should obtain 
the armaments contract. 9 In granting this information, 
the State Department informed Argentina that 
Washington expected the "most favorable opportunity" 
for her manufacturers. 10 
When Sherrill arrived in Buenos Aires in June 
he found that the Argentine naval commission had 
returned from Europe and was considering tenders for 
the new construction. Moreover, that England, France, 
Germany and Italy were all bringing strong pressure to 
bear upon the Argentine government to secure the con-
tracts for their respective armament firms. "The 
political influence of foreign powers", complained one 
United State company representative, "is being exerted 
in a very forceful manner to turn the business to 
English and Continental firms; the King of Italy, the 
9Meigs to Navy Dept., May 12, 1909, Num, File 
1070/55, letter 
10wilson to Knox, March 7, 1909. Num. File 
Memorandum 
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German Emperor and the force of English diplomacy 
are being made use of; and American firms will have 
very little consideration, I fear, unless our 
government will exert powerful influence in favor 
of this country11 • 11 
Sherrill wasted little time in aiding the 
United States companies. Within sixty days after 
presenting his credentials, the Minister had discussed 
the battleship iss~e with all the officials concerned, 
twice with President Alcorta and five times with 
Foreign Minister, De la Plaza. 12 He presented them 
with copies of reports made by United States naval 
officers during their recent trip around the world and 
emphasized that awarding the contracts to North 
.American firms would be a graceful way of showing 
Argentine goodwill. 13 
To help his Minister, Taft supported the 
removal of import duty on hides from Argentina. As a 
result the amount of non-dutiable Argentine exports 
to the United States increased from 17% to 49%. 14 




Knox, July 8, 1909. Num. File 
13sherrill to 
1070/75, no.38 
Knox, July 29, 1909. Num. File 
1\icGann, T.F. Argentina the United States, 
and the Inter-American System 1880-1914. (Cambridge, 
1957), pg.261 
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Promises of further reciprocal favours were held out 
as an inducement for Buenos Aires to sign a North 
.American contract. These included the establishment 
of a United States bank in the Argentine capital and 
subsidies for a direct steamship line. 15 
Despite these overtures, however, opposition 
to the North .American bidders in Argentina remained 
formidable. Both the naval commission and the 
Minister of Marine had a »strong predilection" 
for the British firms. 16 The Vice E'.resident o:f the 
Republic, Roque Saenz Pena favoured Italy, where he 
had been the Argentine ambassador for many years; 
whilst the Minister of War wanted the contracts to go 
to Germany, so as to standardize the military and 
naval equipment of the oountry. 17 
To overcome this bias, Sherrill sought the 
support of key political figures and the Argentine 
press. He exerted special persuasion upon the editors 
of La Prensa who were enthusiastic advocates of naval 
expansion. Consequently that paper began to strongly 
urge the adoption of North American methods and materials 
in the construction of the proposed warships. 18 When 
15wilson to Sherrill, Sept.30, 1909. Num. File 
1070/80, telegram 
16sherrill to Knox, Sept.20, 1090. Num. File 
1070/102, no.94 
17sherrill to Knox, Aug.27, 1909. Num. File 
1070/77, no.71 
1?.sherrill to Knox, Sept.9, 1909. Num. File 
1070/89, no.85 
97. 
other Argentine newspapers reported United States 
armour plate to be defective, La Prensa defended 
and praised the Yankee product. 19 
Du.ring interviews with the Foreign Minister, 
Sherrill stressed the isolated position of Argentina, 
surrounded by a hostile coalition of Brazil, Uruguay, 
Bolivia and Chile. He intimated that it might be well 
for Buenos Aires to cultivate the friendship of 
Washington. 20 After De la Plaza bluntly asked if 
Washington would support his country in a war with 
its neighbours, the North American Minister replied 
the knowledge that the Argentine battleships were being 
built in the United States "will tend to restrain any 
power desirous of our friendship from making war upon 
Argentina during the time of the construction of these 
vessels in American yards 11 • 21 As a resultboth the Foreign 
Minister and President became favourable to the Yankee 
firms. 
Throughout the negotiations representatives of 
the various North American companies at Buenos Aires 
worked in close harmony. Daily conferences were held 
between them, while it was agreed that should the 
United States win the contracts, the work would be 
19wilson to Wilson, June 9, 1909. Num. File 
1070/60, telegram 
20sherrill to Knox, July 29, 1909. Num. File 
1070/75, no.38 
21 sherrill to Knox, Jan.23, 1910. Num. File 
1070/197, no.227 
h d 1 ·t1 22 s are as even y as possi e. When the Argentine 
government announced it would not make both awards 
to the same shipyard, Fore River Co. stated its 
willingness to cooperate with the New York Ship-
building Co. in constructing the two vessels. 23 
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The Chief of Latin American Affairs noted, that there 
was a "disposition towards intelligent cooperation 
shown ••••• by the .American competing firms 11 • 24 
In turn the State Department maintained close 
liaison with the interested companies. Special 
effort was made to brief their representatives and, 
through the frequent exchange of telegrams, accurately 
inform them of the latest developments. 25 At Buenos 
Air.es Sherrill regularly met and e.ntertained the 
visiting Horth American businessmen as well as 
26 introduced their Argentine contacts. Were it not 
for this assistance, the President of Fore River 
Company commented, his country would stand no chance 
at all of securing the contracts. 27 
22sherrill to Knox, Aug.27, 1909. Num. File 
1070/77, no.71 
23Fore River Ship Building Co. to Wilson, 
Dec.23, 1909. Num. File 1070/152, telegram 
24r1emorandum by the Chief of Latin American 
Affairs, Jan.22, 1910. Num. File 1070/175 
25ibid 
2.6sherrill to Knox, Aug.27, 1909. Num. File 
1070/77, no. 71 
27sherrill to Knox, Sept.20, 1909. Num. File 
1070/102, no.94 
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The endeavours of the North Americans were 
viewed with some concern by the British Foreign Office. 
Since 1890 the United Kingdom had built thirteen 
cruisers for South American countries, including three 
for Argentina. 28 Never before had Washington exerted 
such political pressure to secure a foreign order for 
its shipyards. The British envoy at Buenos Aires 
complained, that the vigour with which Minister Sherrill 
pursued the claim "is more suitable to a commercial 
tout than a diplomatic representativen. 29 
British financial interests moved quickly to 
thwart the United States bidders. In July diplomatic 
relations were broken off between Argentina and Bolivia?J 
The British companies took advantage of the excitement 
to persuade the Argentine naval commission to reopen 
bids for a larger type battleship. This made difficult 
the participation of North American builders and on 
September 16 1909 the commission recommended that only 
one German, one Italian and one English company be 
invited to bid. 31 
2~ivermore, s.w. "Battleship Diplomacy in 
South America: 1905-1925 11 • Journal of Modern History. 
Vol. xvi, (1944) pg.37 
29Towley to Grey, Jan.29, 1910. P.R.O.F.O. 
371/824/8774-. 1909 Annual Report, pg.7 
30sherrill to Knox, Sept.20, 1909. Num. File 
1070/102, no.94 
31 sherrill to Knox, Oct.29, 1909. Num. File 
1070/121, no.132 
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Sherrill protested strongly to the Argentine 
President against the commission's ruling. As a result 
the United States companies were given three weeks in 
which to prepare new plans. The Minister of Marine 
insisted upon a tipo Argentin9 which corresponded 
very closely to the submissions put forward by the 
English bidders. The North Americans agreed to modify 
their warship designs in accordance with the wishes of 
Two events, however, impeded the United States 
cause. Washington feared that because of their diplomatic 
break, Argentina would not invite Bolivia to the Third 
Pan American Conference at Buenos Aires. The State 
Department, therefore, ordered Sherrill to secure 
Bolivia's invitation to the conference regardless of any 
consideration for the naval contracts. 33 De la Plaza 
greatly resented the North American interference. 34 
Secondly, the State Department instructed its 
Minister in Buenos Aires to obtain an extension of the 
bidding deadline until November 24, 1909. Sherrill 
objected on the grounds that the Foreign Minister was 
already being severely criticised for:the delay and so 
could hardly grant any further postponements. However, 
32sherrill to Knox, Dec.12, 1909. Num. File 
1070/132, telegram 
33sherrill to Knox, Sept.20, 1909. Num. File 
1070/102, no.94 
34sherrill to Knox, oct.s, 1909. Num. File 
1070/96, telegram 
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the Department persisted and its Minister received 
the angry refusal expected. This event also seriously 
weakened Sherrill' s influence in the Argentine capi tai.35 
In an effort to retrieve the situation, Washing-
ton stepped up the pressure on Buenos Aires. At the 
request of Secretary Knox the As.sistant Secretary of 
State for Latin American Affairs met with the Argentine 
Minister. He stressed that both Mr. Knox and the 
President took Hthe greatest possible interestn in 
United States manufacturers receiving a share of the 
battleship contracts and that such an award would 
favourably impress North .American public opinion. 
More importantly, it would have a beneficial effect 
upon those United states firms preparing exhibits for 
the Buenos Aires international exposition. 36 
Once more, as a further inducement, the 
administration offered the use of North .American naval 
secrets. Those Argentine ships built in the United 
States would be fitted with the same guns, turrets 
and,sight apparatus as used on North American vessels. 
The State Department also reminded Minister Portela 
of the President's efforts to secure free hides and 
warned that failure to grant the contract to North 
America would have a bad effect upon bilateral 
35ibid 
36Assistant Secretary of State to Adee, 
Sept.24, 1909. Num, File 1070/91, Memorandum 
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commercial relations. 37 P.·Ieanwhile, under constant 
pressure from the heads of United States companies, 
Secretary Knox exhorted his Legation at Buenos Aires 
to "bend every effort" to "force this battleship 
question to a successful issue 11 • 38 
On November 1 1909 the Argentine naval commission 
recommended that Fore River Ship Building Company along 
with four other European firms be included in the 
second round of biddi:ng. 39 Although standing last on 
the list, the North .American bid was generally believed 
to be the lowest. The Argentine naval authorities were 
now also exhibiting strong interest in Yankee torpedo 
equipment. Sherrill noted, that this was despite 
the fact that United States companies appeared to be 
the only bidders not paying commissions. 40 
Before the North American Minister could capital-
ize on this interest another setback arose to threaten 
his negotiations. Relations between Buenos Aires and 
Washington deteriorated greatly as a result of the 
Alsop affair. Public opinion in Argentina saw the 
North American ultimatum to Chile as dictatorial and 
belligerent. Sherrill reported that the support of 
President Alcorta had been lost at a crucial stage and, 
37wilson to Sherrill, Sept.30, 1909. Num. File 
1070/80, telegram 
38Knox to Sherrill, Dec.7, 1909. Num. File 
1070/125, telegram 
39sherrill to Knox, 
1070/159, no.181 
Dec.9, 1909. Num. File 
40sherrill to Knox, Nov.9, 1909. Num. File 
1070/126, no.144 
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that unless something was done quickly to counter-act 
the anti-American sentiment, 11 it seems hopeless 
to expect that we will be successful in the awards 11 • 41 
British interests were quick to exploit the 
situation. There had been general concern at the 
esteem with which the United States Minister in Buenos 
Aires was held by the Argentine authorities. Consequent-
ly, attempts were made through the English-speaking 
newspapers to discredit North .Amsrica.i.'1 policy towards 
Chile and South America. It was, the Buenos Aires 
Herald wrote, 11 a policy beginning in dollars and 
ending in bluff" with Latin America having to "stand 
together to repel northern aggression11 • 42 
More importantly, the British company, Annstrong-
Vickers, used the Alsop incident to persuade the 
Argentine naval commission to accept a reduced bid. 
Although rated second of those companies acceptable 
to Buenos Aires, Armstrong-Vickers• plans called 
for more expense than the North American. As a result, 
in return for increased speed and more armour on the 
battleships, the British firm was allowed to lower 
its figure $570,000 in order to bring it under that 
of the Fore River Company. 43 
41 sherrill to Knox, Nov.25, 1909. Num. File 
1070/155, no.160 
42ibid. 
43sherrill to Knox, Dec.10, 1909. Num. File 
1070/127, telegram 
Sherrill immediately set about securing a 
similar concession for the North Americans. He 
argued that the United States firms had had less 
than half the time given their competitors to 
modify designs and that slight alterations not 
affecting price would make their submissions more 
acceptable. For this reason, all the companies 
should have equal opportunity to submit new bids. 
The :Minister of Marine agreed reluctantly 
December 16 reopened bidding. 44 
To counter hostile public opinion over the 
Alsop affair the United States Minister enlisted, 
once more, the aid of ~a Prensa. Conferring with 
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its editor to early in the morning, Sherrill obtained 
an article strongly endorsing the North American 
position. 45 Similar persuasion was exerted on 
government officials and other Argentine newspapers, 
while a firm protest was lodged against the anti-American 
bias of the Buenos Aires Herald. 46 The British 
Minister, Townley, complained "hardly a day passed 
that (the North American envoy) did not find some 
excuse to go to Government House and press the claims 
of his countrymen 11 , 47 
44ibid 
45sherrill to Knox, Nov.25, 1909. Num. File 
1070/155, no.160 
46Townley to Gre,y, Dec, 31, 1909. P.R.Q.F.O. 
371/824/3432. Summary of Ev.ents for December 1909. 
47Townley to Grey, Jan.29, 1910. P.R.O.F.O. 
371/824/8774. 1909 Annual Report, pg.11 
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In an effort to strengthen Sherrill's hand, the 
new Division of Latin .American Affairs drew up a list 
of six special concessions to Argentine desires. 
These included a substantial congressional appropriation 
for the Pan-American Oonference at Buenos Aires in 
July 1910 and the dispatch of a squadron of North 
.American warships to the Argentine Centennial 
Celebrations in May 1910. The United States would 
from 
raising the question of the jurisdiction of the waters 
of the Rio de la Plata. 48 Meanwhile, the State 
Department had submitted the Alsop claims to the 
arbitration of King Edward VII. 
On January 15, 1910 the Argentine naval 
commission reported unanimously that the North 
American proposals for the battleships were the best. 49 
The British Minister immediately demanded a reclassifi-
cation in favour of his countrymen, but the Argentine 
cabinet refused to receive his note of protest. 50 
48Memorandum from the Division of Latin-American 
Affairs, Jan.10, 1910. Num. File 1070/161 
49Adee to Sherrill, Jan.15, 1910. Num. File 
1070/164, telegram 
50sherrill to Knox, Jan.19, 1910. Num. File 
1070/166, telegram 
Sherrill met with the Minister of Finance, the 
President's most imtimate friend in the cabinet, 
and reiterated the goodwill that would be created 
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if Buenos Aires were to award the contracts to North 
American shipyards. 51 
Finally, on January 21 1910, the Argentine 
naval commission awarded contracts for two battleships 
worth more than $20 million to the Fore River Ship 
Bu.ilding Company. 52 In addition the Bethlehem Steel 
Corporation received orders totalling one million 
dollars to manufacture artillery for torpedo boats. 
Buenos Aires did not ignore its European connections 
completely and contracts for twelve destroyers were 
distributed evenly among England, France and Germany. 53 
After seven months of "constant, aggressive and 
prompt action", Sherrill's negotiations had been 
brought to a successful conclusion. 54 Reported the 
exhausted envoy lf•••••I have lost 22 pounds in weight 
since my arrival here June 19 11 • 55 
51 sherrill to Knox, Jan.s, 1910. Num. File 
1070/183, no.214 
52sherrill to Knox, Jan.21, 1910. Num. File 
1070/169, telegram 
53sherri11 to Knox, Jan.21, 1910. Num. File 
1070/170, telegram 
54rilemorandum by the Ohief of Latin American 
Affairs, Jan.22, 1910. Num. File 1070/175 
55sherri11 to Knox, Oct.9, 1909. Num. File 
1070/107, no.117 
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The Taft administration was elated at the 
success of its diplomatic efforts in Argentina. Both 
the President and Secretary of State conveyed to 
Sherrill their appreciation of 11 the intelligent and 
tactful manner" with which he had conducted the 
negotiations. 56 In contrast the British remained 
highly displeased. The Times charged the North 
Americans with having recklessly slashed prices 
and with having exerted unfair diplomatic pressure 
to get the business, while the London Evening 
Standard complained "England is Argentina's greatest 
creditor and greatest client and had a right to 
expect the naval contracts 11 • 57 
The use of "battleship diplomacy" signified 
a new chapter in United States policy towards 
Argentina. For the first time North American diplomats 
and businessmen had combined in a united effort to 
penetrate that market. Using both financial and 
diplomatic pressure they overcame the intense 
56wilson to Sherrill, Jan.27, 1910. Num. File 
1070/172, no.67. Also Sherrill, c. My Story Book 
(Private Printing, 1938) pg.105 
57Quoted in Livermore, s.w., "Battleship 
Diplomacy in South America: 1905-1925". Journal 
of Modern History, Vol.xvi (1944). 
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competition of thirty or.more bidders £rom England 
and five other nations. Their success, along with 
that of the Chicago packers, underlined the economic 
power and political influence the United States 
had now achieved in Argentina. 
109. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONSOLIDATION AND EXPANSION, 1910 - 1914 
By 1910 both Argentina and the United States 
had realized much of their nineteenth century promise. 
North American industrial capacity had grovm 1 , 
dramatically, 1 while Argentina had become the world's 
greatest exporter of food products and raw materials. 
Aware of the need for and the benefits of increased 
bilateral trade, United States businessmen and 
diplomats moved to greatly expand their budding foot-
hold in the Republic. As a result, during the years 
immediately prior to World War I, North American-
Argentine commerce entered the first boom period in 
its history. 
United States participation in the Argentine 
Centennial Celebrations reflected the new importance 
Washington attached to her relations with that country. 
In May 1910 Major General Leonard Wood arrived as 
"Special Ambassador" to the event along with a 
Special Service Squadron of four battleships. The 
General's appointment and his complimentary remarks 
1rn 1900 the value of manufacturing capital in 
the United States was approximately ~HU. S.) 9. 8 billion. 
Ten years later this had gro~m to $18.4 billion. 
Nearing, s., and Freeman J., Dollar Di~lomacy. A Study 
in .American Imperialism. (New York, 1 25), pg.3 
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about the Republic's progress were warmly appreciated 
by the Argentine government and press. 2 Editorials 
noted that only as a result of the North American 
action did some European countries decide to send 
ambassadors. 3 
Also during 1910, Washington participated 
in the Fourth Pan-American Conference at Buenos Aires. 
The United states delegation comprised a number of 
distinguished North Americans, who made every effort 
to remove controversial questions from the agenda. 4 
When the Brazilian delegation sought to have the 
Conference endorse the Monroe Doctrine, the North 
American and Argentine representatives worked together 
to have the motion withdrawn. Consequently, in his 
closing address to the Assembly, Argentina's Foreign 
Minister praised the United States commitment to 
Pan .Americanism and expressed a desire for greater 
hemispheric unity. President Alcorta observed, that 
2Bliss to Knox, Oot.15, 1910. National Archives, 
DeEartment of State Records, American Affairs, 
Ar&entina. necimal Series. (Hereafter cited as 
Bee. Ser.) 711.35/19, no.675 
3sherrill to Knox, June 13, 1910. Num. File 
15504/15, no.420 
4sherrill to Knox, Aug.25, 1919. Num. File 
11302/48. The North .American delegation included 
Henry White (Chairman), General Enoch H. Crowder, 
David Kinley, John Bassett Moore, Bernard Moses and 
Pauls. Reinsch. 
hiscou.ntry's relations with North America could not 
be bettered. 5 
Underlying this United States-Argentine 
harmony was a spectacular growth in trade between 
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the two countries. In 1913 Argentine imports from 
North America amounted to $70,000,000 - an increase 
of ~~14,000,000 over that in 1911. 6 The United States 
portion of Argentina's total trade (15%) now 
surpassed those of France and Belgium and rivalled 
that of Germany. The United Kingdom, however, 
retained the greatest share. 7 
Foremost among North American imports into the 
Republic were manufactured goods. Of these oil, 
automobiles, railway cars, twine and leather remained 
the most important items, each with sales of over a 
million dollars. Also on the market in increasing 
numbers were such new products as elevators, adding 
and sewing machines, cameras and typewriters. By 1914 
the United States had become Argentina's largest 
supplier of machine goods. 8 
5sherrill to Knox, Sept.12, 1910. Dec. Ser. 
711.35/18, no.617 
6united States Dept. of Commerce, The Economic 
Position of Argentina During the.War (Misc. Series, No. 
88; Washington, 1920) pg.86-88 
7sherrill to Knox, Aug.11, 1910. Dec. Ser. 
635.00, no.550 
8ibid. Also Ferrer, J., "United States-
Argentine Economic Relations 1900-1930". Ph.D. Thesis. 
(University of California, 1964) pg.66-67 
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Argentine exports to her northern neighbour 
were similarly growing, reaching ~~32, 000, 000 in 1 91 2 
before suffering a severe drop the following year due 
to crop failure. 9 The removal of hides from the tariff 
schedule and the development of linseed, g_uebra<::,.h<?, 
extract and sausage casings as major exports stimulated 
greater bilateral trade. In spite of this, however, 
the North .American share of Argentina's total exports 
remained relatively constant (6.3%). As late as 1913 
England, Germany; France and Belgium were still better 
customers. 10 
Traditional barriers continued to impede the 
growth of United States-Argentine commerce. Irregular 
and inadequate shipping facilities hampered the 
movement of mail and cargoes. In May 1910 the North 
American Consul General reported that for six months 
not a single merchant vessel flying the Stars and 
Stripes had entered Buenos Aires port. 11 Similarly, 
although supported by the State Department, the 
Central and South .American Telegraph Company failed 
to complete the Atlantic cable to Argentina. 
Communications by telegraph, therefore, remained slow 
9united states Dept. of Commerce, The Economic 
Position of Ar entina Durin the War (.Misc. Series, 
No.8; Washington, 192 , pg. 
10sherrill to Knox, Aug.11, 1910. Dec. Ser. 
635.00, no.550 




The reappearance of foot and mouth disease 
in 1910 provided yet another obstacle to improved 
trade. To prevent contamination of domestic animals, 
the United states declared an embargo against Argentine 
livestock and fodder. 12 A year later a dispute arose 
between Washington and Buenos Aires over Brazilian 
flour duty. When the fonner secured a 30% price 
differential, the Argentine government threatened to 
raise duties on North .American petroleum, lumber 
and other staples. 13 
Despite these hindrances, however, the period 
1910-14 was one of consolidation and expansion for 
North .American influence in Argentina. The Republic's 
growing prosperity was attracting more and more 
immigrants from the United States. By 1912 their 
number had grown to about 5000. 14 Not only did they 
12snyder to Assist. Secretary of State, March 18, 
1907. Dec. Ser. 611.3556 
13unsigned aide-memoire, June 13, 1911. ~ 
Ser. 611.3231/210 
14Ferrer, J. "United States-Argentine Economic 
Relations 1900-1930. 11Ph.D. Thesis (University of 
California, 1964) pg.67 
114. 
provide a market for North .American goods, but through 
personal relationships, greatly assisted in diminishing 
Argentine prejudice towards norteamericanos. 
Moreover, unlike the fugitives from justice of 
the 1880's, the majority of United States citizens 
in Argentina prior to World War One represented 
legitimate business or commercial concerns. In order 
to compete effectively for the Argentine market, 
North American manufacturers were increasingly 
realizing the need for direct representation there. 
By 1911 the General Electric Co., United States Steel 
Products, J.I. Case, the Avery Plow Co. had all 
established salesmen at Buenos Aires. 15 
Parallel to the development of a North American 
business community on the River Plate was a greater 
United states investment in Argentina. There North 
American capital climbed from an.approximate $20,O00t'O00 
in 1910 to $40,000,000 in 1913. Concentrated 
principally on meat packing and other manufacturing 
enterprises, the amount represented only 1.2% of all 
foreign holdings (Table 2). Its rapid growth and 
diversity, however, promised well for the future. 
15sherrill to Knox, Aug.9, 1909. Num. File 
18710/25, no.51 
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Table 2. Estimates of Foreign Capital in 
Argentina (Millions of gold pesos). 16 
Country 1910 1913 
Great Britain 1,475 1,928 
United States 20 40 
Gennany 200 250 
France 410 475 
Others 150 557 
Total 2,255 3,250 
United States financiers had begun to actively 
seek investment opportunities in Argentina. During 
1909 Robert c. Howe, the local representative of 
Annour & Co., approached the Argentine government to 
discuss the construction of grain elevators at La Plata;7 
According to his proposal, Annour & Co. would raise the 
necessary funds by accepting Argentine bonds and selling 
them in the United States. The Minister of Finance 
approved the idea and Congress granted vacant land 
around the port for the elevators. The two parties 
though could not agree upon final tenns. 18 
16Gravil, R. 11 Anglo-u.s. Trade Rivalry in 
Argentina and the ::0 1Abernon Mission of 1929" in 
Ar entina in the Twentieth Oentur (ed) Rock, D. 
Universi yo Pi sburgh Press, 1975) pg.42 
17sherrill to Knox, Sept.19, 1909. Num. File 
22078, no.93. Also Sherrill to Knox, Oct.1, 1909. 
Num. File 22078, no.108 
18sherri'll t Kn lu 18 1909 o ox, ~ov. , • Num. File 
22078, no.154 
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More ambitious was the attempt by United states 
businessmen to challenge British dominance of Argentina's 
railways. In 1912 the Farquhar Syndicate founded the 
Argentine Railway Corporation, which immediately took-
over four minor companies and secured a concession to 
build additional railroad track. A year later the 
Corporation gained control over the Cordoba Central 
Railway, one of the five largest British ~ompanies. 
Again, however, North .American endeavours proved 
fruitless when the Syndicate failed to raise sufficient 
funds to meet its obligations and went into receivership;9 
United States capital had better success with its 
industrial concerns. In order to safeguard and improve 
their supply of raw materials, a growing number of 
manufacturers sought to establish plants in Argentina. 
One such firm, the New York Tanning Extract Company 
began operations at Santa Fe in 1909. The company 
processed twelve hundred tons of quebracho extract a 
month for shipment to North .America. 20 
The same year the Consolidated Chemical Indust-
ries of San Francisco established a factory at Buenos 
Aires. It sought to utilize the large amount of bone 
material unused during meat processing. In 1911 the 
19Hanson, S.G. 0 The Farquhar Syndicate in 
South .America11 • Hispanic American Historical Review. 
Vol.17 (Aug. 1937) pg.314-326 
201etter from New York Tanning Extract Co. to 
Carr, May 27, 1910. Dec. Ser. 125.0035 
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West India Oil Co. followed suit and moved to 
Argentina. By doing so the firm took advantage of the 
duty free status in that country of unrefined 
petroleum. 21 
From Washington came further ind.ications of a 
desire for better relations with Argentina. United 
States politicians and officials who knew the Republic 
continued to work for an enlargement of trade. During 
1911 a Pan .American Commercial Conference,organised 
by John Barrett, now head of the Pan American Union, 
was held in Washington, Over a number of weeks 
Argentine representatives and United States businessmen 
met together to discuss how to profitably bring North 
American money and goods to South .America. 22 
Their efforts were supported by a growing 
number of organisations designed to promote overseas 
trade. These included the .American Exporters and 
Importers Association (1911), the Chamber of Commerce 
of the United States (1912), and the National Foreign 
Trade Council (1914). During 1912 the Bureau of 
Manufacturers was expanded into the Bureau of Foreign 
and Domestic Commerce with special trade commissioners 
and commercial attaches, a number of whom visited 
Argentina, A year later the Chicago Association of 
21 Ferrer, J. "United States-Argentine Economic 
Relations 1900-1930 11 Ph.D. Thesis (University of 
California, 1964) pg.43 
22Proceedings of the Pan-American Commercial 
Conference, Feb. 13-17, 1911. (wasnington, 191 I) 
in McGann, Arg:e,ntina, pg. 262 
Commerce opened a permanent exhibit at Buenos Aires 
to display United States products. 23 
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More than ever before British businessmen and 
officials felt threatened by the North .American 
advance. Growing concern was expressed at the lack 
of competitiveness and enterprise of some British 
exports. Agents for United Kingdom firms now 
experienced greater difficulties in distributing only 
Increasingly they were willing to 
also market goods from the United States. 24 Of 
fifty-one such agents listed in a trade directory 
of 1914, thirteen handled both British and North 
.American products, while one dealt:~ exclusively in 
the latter. 25 
Foreign Office personnel at Buenos Aires noted 
the sudden expansion of United States interests and 
involvement on the River Plate and warned of its 
possible conaequences. During the centennial celebrations 
jealous reference was made to the goodwill and hospitality 
shown to the North American contingent by the Argentine 
23Gravil, R., "Anglo-u.s. Trade Rivalry in 
Argentina", op. cit., pg.42 
24The U.S. Charge d 1affaires ad interim 
reported American made articles were generally 25% 
cheaper than those supplied from Europe. Wilson to 
Knox, April 13, 1909. Num. File, Vol.612, no.144 
25Gravil, R., 11 Anglo-u.s. Trade Rivalry in 
Argentina11 , op. cit., pg.47 
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people. This was contrasted to the resentment 
exhibited against Britain for not participating 
owing to the death of King Edward. 26 Unless steps 
were taken to protect her commercial interests in the 
Republic, one official believed, "there is considerable 
risk that Great Britain will fail to hold her ground 
as against •••••• the United States, who (is) straining 
every nerve to capture the Argentine marke~~ 27 
This sentiment was widely echoed by the 
press in Argentina. The Buenos Aires Herald and the 
Buenos Aires Standard predicted that should Farquhar 
and other North American businessmen firmly establish 
themselves in South America, they would "drag down the 
United States on top of these little republics" and 
British interests would be lost. 28 Consequently they 
argued against a close commercial relationship between 
Washington and Buenos Aires and urged Argentines to 
retain their ties with Eu.rope, employing such arguments 
as appeared in the Buenos Aires Herald on June 22 1909. 
11 The reason why Argentina transacts the bulk of her 
business with the Old World lies in the indisputable 
26Townley to Grey, July 7, 1910. P.R.O.F.O). 
371/824/27832 
27rvrallet to Secretary of the Admiralty, 
Aug.17, 1910. P.R.O.F.q. 371/824/27832/iOa 
28Buenos Aires Standard, October, 1912. 
Quoted in Hanson, S.G. "The Farquhar Syndicate in 
South America". Hispanic American Historic.al Review. 
Vol.17 (Aug. 1937), pg.324 
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fact that it pays her better to do so 11 • 29 
British merchants moved to protect their inter-
ests. During the 1910 Argentine Centenary, a number 
of English trading companies boycotted the exposition 
in an attempt to keep foreign companies from realizing 
the potential of Argentina. Representations were 
made to the United States business community and 
Minister in Buenos Aires to secure their non-participa-
tion as well. This, it was hoped would prevent other 
North American firms from taking an interest in and 
expanding their operations to the Republic. 30 
Sherrill, however, declined the suggestion and 
instead urged United States manufacturers to participate. 
Under his guidance, special committees were formed to 
coordinate the exhibits from North .America at both the 
Railway and Agricultural Expositions. 31 The Minister 
also proposed a special display of great North 
.American inventors, artists and authors. Such an under-
taking, he argued, would·not only increase the cultural 
status of the United States in the eyes of the Argentines 
but weaken the ties of literature, art and science that 
bound them to Europe.32 




to Knox, Dec.12, 1909. Num. File 
311ibid. Also Sherrill to Knox, July 14, 1909. 
Num. File 18710, no.26 
32sherrill to Knox, Nov., 1909. Num. File 
18710/42, no.166 
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In his official capacity as Envoy, Sherrill 
repeatedly emphasised the similarities between the 
Northern and Southern Republics. During a speech at 
the University of Buenos Aires he spoke of the 
contribution of Sarmiento to Pan Americanism and 
linked it to that of Henry Clay and Elihu Root. 33 
Books were distributed by the United States Legation, 
documenting Washington's early recognition of South 
American independence and belittling the importance 
of Canning. 34 Again by these means the Minister 
hoped to raise Argentine awareness of the United States 
and modify that country's preference for Europe, 
particularly England. 
At the outbreak of world War One North America 
still had a long way to go to overcoming this preference, 
especially in the areas of trade and finance. Buenos 
Aires continued to look to the Old World to supply her 
wants and sell her exports, while British investments in 
the Republic now stood at£ 357,750,000. 35 The idea of 
Argentina as an English Colony remained prevalent among 
many Englishmen. Wrote one United States observer, 
33sherrill to Secretary of State, Oct.a, 1909. 
Num. File- Vol.928, no.116 
34sherrill to Knox, June 19, 1910. Num. File 
25685, no.431 
35Rippy, J.F. "British Investments in Latin 
America, End of 191311 • The Journal of Modern History 
Vol.19 (1947) pg.226 
11 In England they talk familiarly of "B.A. 11 and the 
11 River Plate 11 ; disdaining to use the Spanish worns 
Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Buenos Aires. To 
hear them you might suppose they were speaking of 
something they owned, and you would not be so very 
far from the truth".36 
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However, by 1914 the United States was firmly 
established in the Argentine market and the basis 
laid for future North American commercial expansion 
on the River Plate. The tariff changes made by 
Washington the previous year had not only affected 
meat imports. Cereals, wool and guebracho extract 
had also been placed on the free list, while the duty 
on linseed was substantially reduced. Thus, North 
America had become practically a freemarket for all 
Argentine produce. 
The situation of United States manufacturers in 
Argentina was further improved by better facilities 
between the two countries. In 1912 the Munson Line 
announced its intention to establish a direct and 
regular shipping service to Buenos Aires. It began 
operating the following year, but had to charter foreign 
vessels until its own newly purchased ships were completed 
in 1914. As a result goods could be sent more cheaply 
36Bingham, H. Across South America. 




and quickly from New York to South .America. 37 
During November 1914 a United States branch 
bank was established in Buenos Aires, the first one to 
be so. The National City Bank of New York had for a 
number of years been studying investment opportunities 
throughout Latin America. After passage of the Federal 
Reserve Act, which allowed the establishment of 
overseas branches by United States banks it was decided 
to open an Argentine office. North American businessmen 
in the Republic were thus able not only to avoid paying 
commission to foreign bankers, but better preserve 
their commercial secrets. 38 
Finally, during 1914, 1vashington raised its 
Diission in Argentina to the rank of an embassy. 
Foreign Minister Murature welcomed the move as evidence 
of his country's new importance. Argentine resentment 
at the exchange of ambassadors between North America 
and Brazil some years earlier was also to large measure 
placated. 39 Buenos Aires reciprocated and appointed 
Romulo Naon its first ambassador to Washington. In 
doing so, the new United States-Argentine commercial 
relationship was formalized at diplomatic leve1. 40 
37Easum, D.B. "The British-Argentine-United 
States Triangle: A Case Study in International Relations". 
Ph.D. Thesis (University of Princeton, 1953) pg.58 
38The First National Bank of Boston followed 
in July, 1917. 
39Beaupre to Acting Secretary of State, July 11, 
1905. Dip. Des. Vol.45, no.175 
40Bryan to .American Legation, May 16, 1914. 
Dec. Ser. 124.35/106 
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The period 1910-1914 climaxed three decades of 
development in North American-Argentine relations. At 
the outbreak of war bilateral trade figures had grown 
to1significant proportions, United states investments 
in the Republic had begun to multiply, while a thriving 
North American business community was firmly established 
there. Underlying this was the growth of more 
complementary economies between the two countries and 
the removal of tariff barriers by Washington. British 
officials and manufacturers had now come to preceive 
the United States along with Germany as the greatest 
long-term threat to their interests on the Plate. 
When war crune to the Old World the foundations of 
North .American commercial dominance in the New, as 
evidenced by Argentina, had already been laid. 
125. 
CONCLUSION 
The thirty years prior to the First World War 
signified a major readjustment of United States -
Argentine relations. Hitherto the two republics had 
failed to find a common basis for commercial exchange. 
Foremost among the many barriers to increased bilateral 
trade were the similarity of their rich pastoral and 
agricultural lands and the noncomplementary nature 
of their economies. Needing markets to sell her 
produc·e and capital to open up the pampas, Argentina 
sought these instead from across the Atlantic. 
At the end of the nineteenth century, however, 
both countries experienced exceptional internal growth. 
The North American economy developed to the point 
where it needed raw materials for its factories and 
foreign markets for its manufactured goods. With the 
increasing ability of Argentina to supply both, 
Washington saw the benefit of expanding her presence 
on the Plate. This greater involvement was achieved 
through a series of stages and resulted in the fonnation 
of a new commercial and political relationship between 
the two countries. 
Beginning in the 188O's, North America worked 
hard to establish a foothold in the lucrative Argentine 
market. Throughout the decade her businessmen and 
diplomats at Buenos Aires sought to acquire a 
126. 
knowledge of the Republic and actively promote 
United States manufactured goods. A trade commission 
arrived to evaluate the region's potential, while 
North .Americans participated in the first Continental 
Exhibition at the Argentine capital. Such efforts, 
however, remained largely confined to the energy of 
individual officials and entrepreneurs and failed to 
rectify the many barriers to increased bilateral trade. 
During the nineties Washington made a concerted 
effort to overcome these barriers. The United States 
Minister at Buenos Aires was directed to work for a 
reciprocal trade agreement. Despite the ultimate 
failure of his negotiations, a North American political 
and commercial presence in Argentina was now firmly 
established. Not only did trade between the two 
countries reach new heights, but the United States 
became Great Britain's greatest competitor for 
Argentina's import trade. 
Following the turn of the century efforts were 
made to study more systematically ~d extensively 
Argentine tastes and requirements. Increasing numbers 
of Nerth American finns established bra:a.dl offices in 
the Republic, while various government experts arrived 
at Buenos Aires to examine commercial possibilities. 
Organisations like "The North American Society of the 
River Plate 11 worked to encourage greater United States 
awareness of and interest in the region. Through such 
efforts North American exports to Argentina grew and 
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Washington gained monopolies in the supply of certain 
goods. 
Better informed of regional opportunities, 
United States companies also began to invest in the 
Southern Republic. Foremost amongst these were the 
Chicago packinghouses, who needed to secure new 
supplies of chilled and frozen meat. Between 1907 
and 1914 their plants on the River Plate worked together 
to capture the Argentine industry, regulating prices 
and reducing competition amongst themselves. By the 
outbreak of World War One, North Americans controlled 
the major share of that country's meat exports. 
Similarly United States businessmen began to 
actively compete for Argentine government contracts. 
During 1909 North American firms cooperated closely 
with the State Department in an effort to gain the 
naval business of the Republic. Together they exerted 
both financial and diplomatic pressure on Buenos Aires 
to award the battleship contracts to the United States. 
Their success testified to the new political and 
commercial influence of Washington in the region. 
This influence was consolidated and expanded 
during the years immediately prior to World War One. 
A significant North American business community was 
established at Buenos Aires, while a number of 
traditional obstacles to improved commerce between the 
two countries were overcome. Bilateral trade experienced 
rocketing growth with United States combined exports 
and imports now surpassing those of Belgium and France 
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and equalling that of Germany. To Buenos Aires, 
the Northern Republic had become both an important 
trading partner and likely source of future capital. 
One feature of the growing United states 
involvement with Argentina was an increasing Anglo-
.American rivalry on the River Plate, 1880 - 1914. 
Many Britons were convinced that the Argentine 
Republic was an important, if informal part of the 
British Enpire. Within that country, the United 
Kingdom possessed extensive financial interests. 
Faced with a United states increasingly determined 
to assert its new economic power and political 
influence, British merchants and officials fought 
to preserve their commercial predominance. 
Between London and Washington competition 
initially centred on control of Argentina's import 
trade. British business interests sought to undermine 
North .American attempts to establish a larger market 
at Buenos Aires for her products. Discriminatory 
fre:ight and cable rates were imposed on United states 
firms exporting to the Republic, while doubts were 
expressed over the suitability and quality of North 
.American goods. Using British influence over several 
key Argentine industries, companies were encouraged to 
maintain their preference for British exports. 
As Washington began to exert greater diplomatic 
pressure on behalf of her businessmen and financiers, 
English diplomats and newspapers responded by warning 
129. 
Buenos Aires against closer commercial relations 
with North .America. The Buenos Aires Herald and 
Buenos Aires Standard repeatedly attacked United 
states foreign policies in Latin America and raised 
the spectre of Yankee imperialism. Foreign Office 
personnel p.rotested against the award of government 
contracts to North American firms and sought to offset 
further gestures of Argentine goodwill to her northern 
neighbour. At the diplomatic level Buenos Aires was 
again reminded of Britain's extensive financial inter-
ests and most-favoured-nation status in the Republic. 
That Washington managed to overcome this 
opposition can be gauged from her commercial position 
I 
on the Plate vis-a-vis Great Britain at the outbreak 
of World War One. United States businessmen in 
Argentina had not only won control from British firms 
over the meat industry, but had successfully competed 
for major government contracts. North American 
technology had adapted well to Argentine conditions, 
while United States companies now shared many of the 
advantages - banking, shipping and mail facilities -
enjoyed by their United Kingdom counterparts. As a 
result British merchants and officials were expressing 
growing concern about their future prospects in the 
region. 
Between 1880 and 1914 the basis of a vital 
political and commercial relationship between Washing-
ton and Buenos Aires was created. The norteamericanos 
130. 
had begun with major disadvantages in shipping, 
banking and investments and an ignorance of Argentine 
tastes and requirements. By the beginning of the First 
World War they possessed a thorough knowledge of the 
Republic and formed an integral and visible feature 
of her economic life. In return for raw materials 
and food products, Washington was exporting to the 
Plate ever increasing amounts of manufactured goods 
and capital. Over a thirty year period, therefore, 
the North American commercial presence in Argentina 
developed from a distant and vague impression to an 
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